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Abstract
The United States Supreme Court considered seventeen cases raising issues related to the role of attorneys and
the practice of law during the 2009 Term. This body of cases represents a substantial departure from dockets
in recent history, where typically the Court took up less than a handful of cases involving regulation of the
legal profession. While some might consider the increased number of cases addressing the law of lawyering a
mere coincidence, this article contends that something more is occurring. The Court’s decision to devote so
much of its limited time to these matters is noteworthy not only for the individual issues resolved, but also for
the cases’ existence, indeed dominance, on the docket. This article is the first to present a comprehensive
overview of the Supreme Court’s newest lawyering cases. Broadly speaking, the cases fall into two categories:
access to sound lawyering and protection from bad lawyering. The first group of cases addresses access to legal
advice, questioning First Amendment protection of attorney advice and advertising, the application of fee-
shifting statutes to encourage legal representation for meritorious cases, and the availability of an immediate
appeal to preserve attorney-client privilege in the face of a court order to disclose protected materials. The
second group of cases involves harms caused by lawyers. These cases include prosecutorial misconduct and
ineffective assistance of counsel claims where a criminal defense attorney lacks the requisite experience, offers
insufficient mitigation evidence during sentencing, delivers a poor closing argument, gives faulty advice,
misses an essential filing deadline, or fails to request a limiting instruction. Part I of this article examines the
cases individually and highlights the ways each case presents critical issues related to the practice of law and
the regulation of lawyers. Part II turns to a collective reading of the cases, reflecting on the Court’s heightened
interest in affairs of the legal profession, and suggesting insights that might be drawn by viewing these cases as
part of a larger picture, rather than standing alone. Though the full measure of these cases’ impact on
professional responsibility jurisprudence will be realized only with the passing of time, this article offers three
preliminary observations. First, when read together, the cases reveal a troubling pattern of limits on access to
legal advice as well as harms caused by bad lawyering. Second, the cases offer fundamental lessons for those
involved in future regulation of the legal profession. Third, the cases illustrate the importance of constitutional
considerations to the field of lawyer ethics.
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court’s 2009 term presented an 
unprecedented number of cases—twelve argued cases and five per curiam 
decisions—raising issues related to the role of attorneys and the practice of 
law.1  This body of cases represents a substantial departure from dockets in 
recent history, where typically the Court took up less than a handful of 
lawyering cases each term.  While some might consider the increased 
number of cases addressing the law of lawyering a mere coincidence, this 
Article contends that it is something more.  The Court’s devotion of so 
much time to these matters is noteworthy not only for the individual issues 
resolved, but also for the cases’ existence—indeed dominance—on the 
                                                           
 1. In a typical term the Supreme Court hears a handful of such cases at most.  See infra 
Appendix, and notes 17–22 and accompanying text. 
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docket.  This Article offers the first comprehensive overview of the 2009 
cases and their outcomes. 
Broadly speaking, the cases fall into two categories.  The first group of 
cases focuses on access to lawyers and legal advice.  The second group 
examines harms caused by lawyers.  The issues regarding access to legal 
advice include: 
• the First Amendment rights of attorneys to give advice and to 
advertise;2 
• the calculation of attorneys’ fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes3 
as well as whether an attorney holds a property right in such an 
award;4 and 
• the right to an immediate appeal of a challenged attorney-client 
privilege waiver.5 
The concerns surrounding bad lawyering include:   
• the extent to which a prosecutor may face civil liability for procuring 
false testimony and introducing it at trial;6 and  
• the standards for finding ineffective assistance of counsel when a 
criminal defense attorney lacks the requisite experience,7 offers 
insufficient mitigation evidence,8 delivers a poor closing argument,9 
gives faulty advice,10 misses a critical filing deadline,11 or fails to 
request a limiting instruction.12 
                                                           
 2. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010); 
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 792, 794 (8th Cir. 2008), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1341 (2010). 
 3. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 336 F. Appx. 332, 333 (4th Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam), rev’d and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 (2010); Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. 
Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209, 1214, 1230–31 (11th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 
1662, 1669 (2010). 
 4. Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 
2521, 2524 (2010). 
 5. Carpenter v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 541 F.3d 1048, 1052 (11th Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam), aff’d, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009). 
 6. McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 547 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2008), appeal 
dismissed, Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010). 
 7. Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1289, 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 
841, 845 (2010). 
 8. Van Hook v. Anderson, 560 F.3d 523, 525 (6th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded, 
Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2009) (per curiam); Belmontes v. Ayers, 529 F.3d 
834, 848 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded, Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 391 
(2009) (per curiam); Porter v. Attorney Gen., 552 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 
Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2009) (per curiam); Jefferson v. Hall, 570 F.3d 
1283 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded, Jefferson v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 2217, 2223 
(2010) (per curiam); Sears v. State, 514 S.E.2d 429 (Ga. 1999), vacated and remanded, 
Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3261(2010) (per curiam). 
 9. Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F.3d 684, 704 (6th Cir. 2006), rev’d, Smith v. Spisak, 130 
S. Ct. 676, 680 (2010).  
 10. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484 (Ky. 2008), rev’d and remanded, 
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487 (2010).  
 11. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) rev’d and 
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Each case addressed critical issues, many of which cut to the core of an 
attorney’s ability to practice competently and in compliance with the 
profession’s ethical obligations.  Perhaps even more important than the 
facts and holdings of the individual cases, however, is the message 
conveyed by the cases’ collective presence on the Court’s docket.  The 
Court’s devotion of fifteen percent13 of its limited time during the 2009 
term to cases raising questions about the role of lawyers and the practice of 
law is remarkable.  The law governing lawyers is a sometimes ignored, but 
vitally important body of law, essential to the proper function of our justice 
system and our democratic form of government.  The outcomes of these 
cases impact the obligations of attorneys in meaningful ways and, when 
considered together, signal how the Court may be giving concerns about 
the law of lawyering  a higher priority. 
This Article proceeds in two parts.  Part I opens with a discussion to 
define what constitutes “the law of lawyering” for purposes here and to 
provide a brief history of the Court’s attention to this area of law over the 
past decade.  Part I then examines the cases from the 2009 term 
individually, setting forth a summary of the ways in which each presents 
questions related to the law of lawyering.  Part II turns to a collective 
reading of the 2009 cases, reflecting on the Court’s heightened interest in 
lawyering issues, and suggesting insights that might be drawn by viewing 
these cases as part of a larger picture.  In particular, this Part identifies 
intersections among the cases as a means for gaining further understanding 
about how their outcomes may shape the legal profession.  To be sure, the 
influence of these cases on professional responsibility jurisprudence will 
become more apparent over time.  Nevertheless, a careful study of the 
opinions, as well as the briefs and oral arguments in the cases, reveals three 
preliminary observations.  First, when taken as a whole, the cases evidence 
troubling limitations on access to legal advice coupled with an inability to 
fully redress harms caused by bad lawyering.  Second, the cases offer 
helpful lessons for those involved in future regulation of the legal 
                                                           
remanded, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010). 
 12. Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 573 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded, 
130 S.Ct. 2250, 2253 (2010). 
 13. During the 2009 Term, the Court issued eighty-six merits opinions, sixteen (18.6%) 
of which included issues related to lawyering.  See supra notes 2–2 (listing the cases related 
to lawyering); see also Supreme Court of the United States Granted  
and Noted List October Term 2009, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/ 
09grantednotedlist.aspx (last visited June 24, 2010) (providing a comprehensive list of cases 
heard by the Supreme Court in the October 2009 term); SCOTUSblog Final Stats OT09, 
Summary of the Supreme Court’s Workload, October Term 2009, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Stats-OT09-0707101.pdf 
(last visited July 22, 2010).  One lawyering case discussed in the article, Pottawattamie 
County v. McGhee, is not included in this count because the Court did not issue a merits 
opinion in the case.  See discussion infra notes 205 to 233.      
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profession.  Third, the cases illustrate the importance of constitutional 
considerations to the field of lawyer ethics.  An awareness of these 
observations will assist scholars and practitioners in appreciating the 
Court’s increased attention to the law of lawyering during the 2009 term. 
I. MERE COINCIDENCE?  A SUMMARY OF THE CASES 
At the outset, it is important to understand what is meant by the law of 
lawyering, and how the cases discussed in this Article have been collected.  
The term “law of lawyering” (or lawyer ethics, legal ethics, professional 
responsibility, law governing lawyers—all other ways to describe a similar 
body of law14) encompasses the legal regulations and ethical obligations 
governing lawyers.  These regulations and obligations can be found in 
sources like the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers but,   as Ted Schneyer observes, “the law of 
lawyering” consists of “strands of law whose only commonality is their 
bearing on the work of a diverse profession” which can make the term 
difficult to define.15  Furthermore, James Moliterno explains that 
“[b]ecause defining much of the law of lawyering depends on the norms of 
practice, so too the law of lawyering varies according to the practice setting 
in which the affected lawyer’s work exists.”16  As used in this Article, a 
“lawyering” issue is understood to be a topic covered by leading casebooks 
in the field and related to the role of an attorney and the practice of law.17  
                                                           
 14. Though these terms often are used interchangeably, they also can be understood to 
hold specific meanings. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:  
ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 4 (2d ed. 1998) (“What is the ‘ethics’ in legal ethics?  
That in itself is a matter of ethical debate.  In a narrow sense, the term refers to the law of 
lawyering—the formal rules governing attorneys’ conduct.  In a broader sense, legal ethics 
involves application of ethical theory and implicates deeper questions about the moral 
dimensions of our professional lives.”).  For further discussion on the various terms used to 
describe this area of law, see posting of John Steele to Legal Ethics Forum and related 
comments, http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2010/06/-least-analytically-rigorous-and-
hence-most-subjective-of-lawschool-subjects-legal-ethics.html (June 14, 2010, 18:24 EST). 
 15. Ted Schneyer, The ALI’s Restatement and the ABA’s Model Rules:  Rivals or 
Compliments?, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 25, 25 (1993) (explaining that the law of lawyering “has 
only lately been conceived as a distinct legal field” and consists of “constitutional doctrine, 
statutory law, and of course the American Bar Association’s legal ethics codes as adopted 
by state supreme courts”) (citation omitted).   
 16. James E. Moliterno, Practice Setting as an Organizing Theme for a Law and Ethics of 
Lawyering Curriculum, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 394 (1998); see also DEBORAH 
RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 1 (4th Ed. 2004) (observing that “the law of 
lawyering—the codes of conduct and the other bodies of law governing legal practice—
structures but by no means limits” the universe of “legal ethics”). 
 17. In collecting cases from the 2009 term and also the preceding decade, the general 
contents of three leading casebooks were used as a guide:  Rhode & Luban, supra note 16 
(covering the concept of a profession, the American legal profession, professional 
independence and professional codes, the advocate’s role in an adversary system, 
confidentiality and attorney-client privilege, criminal defense, prosecutorial ethics, ethics in 
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These topics include the duty to render candid advice, lawyer advertising, 
attorneys’ fees, attorney-client privilege, prosecutorial ethics, and 
ineffective assistance of counsel.18  That some of these cases overlap into 
                                                           
organizational settings, negotiation and mediation, the lawyer’s counseling role, conflicts of 
interest, lawyer-client decision making, market regulation, the distribution of legal services, 
admission to the bar, discipline and malpractice, and legal education); STEPHEN GILLERS, 
REGULATION OF LAWYERS, (8th ed. 2009) (covering the attorney-client relationship, 
conflicts of interest, special lawyer roles, avoiding and redressing professional failure, and 
first amendment rights of lawyers and judicial candidates); and LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. 
SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (2d ed. 2008) (covering the 
regulation of lawyers, lawyer liability, client confidences, attorney-client privilege, 
relationships between lawyers and clients, conflicts of interest, lawyers’ duties to courts, 
lawyers’ duties to adversaries and third parties, regulatory restrictions on law practice, and 
the provision of legal services).     
18.The regulation of judicial conduct is also often encompassed under the law of 
lawyering umbrella, but for purposes of this Article and the Appendix of cases involving a 
lawyering issue that follows, cases involving regulation of the judiciary or judicial 
misconduct have been excluded.  See, e.g., Sao Paolo v. American Tobacco Co., 535 U.S. 
229 (2002) (per curiam) (judicial recusal); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 
765 (2002) (judicial election campaigns); and Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 
2252 (2009) (judicial recusal).  Likewise some law of lawyering casebooks address lawyers’ 
use of peremptory challenges, and those cases have been excluded from this survey as well.  
See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 
(2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).  It also should be noted that certain 
aspects of civil procedure may appear in the casebooks, but for purposes here such cases 
were included only if they also directly addressed the professional or ethical obligations of 
the attorney involved.  For example, Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter is a case 
involving civil procedure that was included because it also involved protection of attorney-
client privilege (see discussion infra notes 171 to 204 and accompanying text), but Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (announcing new “plausibility” 
standard for complaint to survive a motion to dismiss) was not included.  A similar selection 
process was used for ineffective assistance of counsel cases as well, thus excluding cases 
like Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000) (holding “that an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim can 
itself be procedurally defaulted”); Glover v. United States, 331 U.S. 198, 204 (2001) 
(finding prejudice in sentencing error but “express[ing] no opinion on the ultimate merits of 
Glover’s claim because the question of deficient performance is not before us”); Massaro v. 
United States, 538 U.S. 500, 509 (2003) (“hold[ing] that failure to raise an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a 
later, appropriate proceeding”); Arave v. Hoffman, 552 U.S. 117, 188 (per curiam) (2008) 
(granting motion to vacate and dismissing ineffective assistance of counsel case as moot); 
and Magwood v. Patterson, 130 S. Ct. 2788, 2803 (2010) (holding “that Magwood’s first 
application challenging his new sentence . . . is not ‘second or successive’” and declining to 
“address Magwood’s contention that the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting his ineffective-
assistance claim”).  Last, some cases are close calls and open for debate as to whether a 
“lawyering” issue is raised.  For example, during the 2005 term the Court decided Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006), holding that the whistle-blowing activity of a 
government employee, who happened to be a district attorney, was not protected under the 
First Amendment.  This case is not included in the Appendix because the Court’s focus was 
on Ceballos’s speech as a government employee, not a lawyer.   Similarly, in 2007 the Court 
decided Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571 (2007), a case involving 
paralegal fees that is excluded here.  In some instances one might argue for the exclusion or 
KNAKE_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2010  10:44 AM 
2010]  INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE LAW OF LAWYERING 1505 
other areas of law, such as criminal law, civil procedure, or bankruptcy, 
does not mean that they are not also law of lawyering cases.  Indeed, in 
many ways the law of lawyering permeates all areas of the law.19   
It also is important to understand the methodology employed in this 
Article for analyzing the Court’s treatment of the law of lawyering.20  This 
Article is not intended to offer a comprehensive empirical analysis, and 
leaves that endeavor for another day.  Rather, the Article looks back at the 
past decade in an effort to assess whether the Court’s selection of seventeen 
cases involving lawyering issues during the 2009 term was, in fact, 
unusual.  In order to provide a meaningful comparison with the previous 
terms, all merits opinions issued by the Court since the 1999 term were 
reviewed.  Opinions touching on an issue related to the law of lawyering, as 
defined above, were included in the count for each term, with the exception 
of several categories such as cases dismissed as improvidently granted and 
cases involving judges.21  While the survey of cases conducted here is not 
intended to be a complete quantitative examination of the Court’s attention 
to the law of lawyering, the survey does provide a sufficient background to 
appreciate just how unusual it is for seventeen cases involving lawyering 
issues to find their way to the Court during a single term.  Moreover, 
though this Article examines only the previous decade, others suggest that 
earlier terms have been even more sparse in their inclusion of cases 
involving lawyering issues.22 
                                                           
inclusion of a particular case that did or did not make the list contained in the Appendix.  
Even so, adding or omitting one or two cases for a particular term does not impact the 
ultimate conclusion that the 2009 docket presented an unusually large number of cases 
involving lawyering issues.   
 19. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:  ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE 
METHOD 4 (2d ed. 1998) (“Legal ethics deserves discussion in all substantive areas [of the 
law] because it arises in all substantive areas.”).  For further discussion of the structure and 
history of lawyer regulation, see id. at 40–50. 
 20.   This survey expands on the analysis of Supreme Court cases contained in the 
author’s online essay previewing the 2009 term, Renee Newman Knake, Prioritizing 
Professional Responsibility and the Legal Profession:  A Preview of the United States 
Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 Term, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 1 (2009), 
portions of which are incorporated in this Article.  The initial analysis relied on the 
classification of cases by sources such as the Findlaw Supreme Court Case Index and 
database searches in Lexis and Westlaw using several queries.  For the list that appears in 
the Appendix, all merits opinions were reviewed for lawyering issues as described supra 
notes 14–19; infra 21–22 and accompanying text.  The list contained in theAppendix 
resulted in a slight increase (no more than three) in the number of lawyering opinions for 
two of the terms. 
 21. For further explanation about the collection of cases included in this survey and 
listed in the Appendix, see supra notes 17–20.  
 22.  See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.15 
(1983) (noting that over the course of twenty-five years the Supreme Court granted review 
of state court decisions on attorney bar-related matters on only eight occasions); see also 
Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II:  Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 
IOWA L. REV. 601, 627 (1990) (estimating that from 1975–1990 the Supreme Court 
considered the professional conduct of lawyers in only ten cases).   
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During the ten years before the 2009 term, the Supreme Court heard no 
more than a handful of cases addressing issues related to the role of an 
attorney and the practice of law in any term.23  The lawyering cases on the 
Court’s docket in 2009 were at least triple the number on previous dockets 
over the past decade.  Thus one might conclude, simply based on this 
sizeable increase in quantity alone, that the Court’s attention to lawyering 
issues must be more than mere coincidence.  Yet the cases heard in the 
2009 term are remarkable for more than just their quantity; their substance 
also must be considered.  For example, the Court decided significantly 
more cases touching on lawyering issues in ineffective assistance of 
counsel cases than in previous terms (ten in 2009 compared to 
approximately two or three at most in previous years).24  The Court also 
took up a number of cases addressing access to lawyers and legal advice, as 
discussed more fully in Part I.A. of this Article.  Of further note is the 
dominance of cases involving constitutional issues.25 
Two questions necessarily follow.  First, why this sudden spike in cases 
related to the legal profession?  Second, what lessons or conclusions might 
be drawn from the particular issues raised and the outcomes of the cases?  
As to the first question, perhaps the upsurge is simply a reflection of an 
increased number of petitions presenting questions related to law practice,26 
or the fact that the most recently appointed Justices have more law practice 
experience than their predecessors.27  Or it may be that the larger 
movement toward increased scrutiny of attorney regulation, particularly in 
the wake of recent corporate28 and government29 scandals involving 
                                                           
 23. See Appendix listing cases.  See also notes 17–21 and accompanying text. 
 24. See Appendix listing cases by term and identifying lawyering issues.  
 25. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 26. Although beyond the scope of this Article, a historical review or survey of petitions 
for certiorari addressing issues related to the legal profession and their dispositions would be 
an interesting area for future research and might lend further insight into the significance of 
the Court’s lawyering focus during the 2009 term. 
 27. See, e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:  Hostility to Litigation 
as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 
1117 n.66 (2005) (“All nine of the Justices of the late Rehnquist Court were graduates of 
elite schools with either little practice experience or practice experience largely limited to 
constitutional litigation or defense-side civil litigation.”).  To compare, the most recent 
appointees to the Court all have significant experience engaging in the practice of law.  See 
Angie Drobnic Holan, Sotomayor’s Experience Does <ot Significantly Outstrip Other 
Justices, POLITIFACT, May 26, 2009, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2009/may/26/barack-obama/sotomayors-experience-does-not-
significantly-outst/ (listing law practice experience of Supreme Court justices).   
 28. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer—A Brief Informal History of a 
Myth with Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1205 (2009) (observing 
that “in the wake of several major scandals, such as the savings-and-loan crisis and the 
Enron collapse, . . . lawyers . . . were found to have actively enabled frauds that resulted in 
huge losses”); Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties:  Speech Rights and Duties within Twenty-
First-Century <ew Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1265 (2009) (observing that 
“[a]fter the early twenty-first-century financial scandals, many pointed a blaming finger to 
KNAKE_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2010  10:44 AM 
2010]  INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE LAW OF LAWYERING 1507 
lawyers, has led to a greater sensitivity to these issues.  Regardless of the 
cause, the Court’s heightened interest at a minimum is reflected in, if not 
influenced by, the popular momentum for attorney regulation reforms.  
Inclusion of so many cases involving lawyering issues on the 2009 docket 
demonstrates the Supreme Court’s prioritization of concerns about the role 
of attorneys and the practice of law. 
As for the second question, the remainder of this Article is devoted to 
identifying themes and reflecting on lessons that might be drawn from the 
Court’s attention to lawyering issues.  Before turning to these observations, 
however, the individual cases deserve attention.  Two broad themes can be 
drawn from the cases taken up by the Supreme Court during the 2009 term:  
access to lawyers and harm caused by lawyers.  The cases are summarized 
below.30 
A.  Cases Addressing Access to Lawyers 
1. Access to legal advice 
One of the more important aspects of access to legal advice facing the 
Court during the 2009 term was the degree of First Amendment protection 
warranted (if any) when Congress limits lawful legal advice.  An attorney’s 
ability to deliver complete and competent advice, and a client’s right to 
receive such advice, goes to the very heart of access to the law.  
Traditionally, governance of attorney advice has been left to the highest 
court in each state, and professional conduct rules provide direction for 
                                                           
the attorneys who had worked for the fallen corporations, arguing that the ‘[l]awyers’ 
negligence almost certainly contributed to the wave of corporate scandals that shook the 
securities markets in 2001 and 2002’” and referencing new regulatory efforts) (quoting 
Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2227 
(2004)). 
 29. See, e.g., Judge Marcia S. Krieger, A Twenty-First Century Ethos for the Legal 
Profession:  Why Bother?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 865, 878–79 (2009) (considering modern 
ethics regulation and stating that “distrust of lawyers . . . is not at all surprising given the 
steady drumbeat of scandals involving business people, government figures, lawyers and 
judges.  One only need reflect on recent scandals that embroiled prominent leaders (many of 
whom were lawyers):  President Bill Clinton, U.S. Congressmen Randy Cunningham and 
Robert Ney, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, 
Alaska Senator Ted Stevens and the justice department attorneys that prosecuted him, as 
well as a variety of federal and state judges”). For further discussion of attorney 
involvement in corporate and government scandals, see W. Bradley Wendel, 
Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1175 (2005) (discussing the 
involvement of lawyers in cases where legal advice facilitated or permitted client wrong-
doing, and suggesting as a possible cause the fact that  the lawyers “expected some degree 
of secrecy, either through the audit lottery (in the case of tax shelters), the cover provided by 
byzantine transactions and obfuscated disclosures (the Enron manipulations), or geographic 
isolation and covert activities (the interrogations at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib)”). 
 30. It should be noted that while several of the cases discussed in this Article present 
additional important questions not related directly to the law of lawyering, the focus here is 
limited to concerns bearing on the practice of law or the relationship between attorneys and 
clients.   
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attorneys regarding their duties and obligations to render guidance to 
clients.  For example, the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) require that an attorney “provide 
competent representation,”31 “exercise independent professional 
judgment,”32 “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit 
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation,”33 and 
“render candid advice.”34  Two cases from the 2009 term involved federal 
statutes encroaching on a lawyer’s ability to advise her client.35 
a. Competent advice, compelled advertising, and the first 
amendment:  Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States 
In Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States36 the Court was 
asked to define the First Amendment protection that attorney advice and 
advertising deserves in a challenge to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).37  This case raised two 
previously unaddressed issues in First Amendment jurisprudence:  the level 
of constitutional protection afforded to attorney advice and, 
correspondingly, the level of constitutional protection afforded to the 
client’s right to receive that advice.38  The plaintiffs also questioned the 
constitutionality of the BAPCPA’s provisions that impose various 
disclosure requirements on attorneys’ advertisement of bankruptcy 
services.39 
To understand the issues involved in this appeal, some explanation of the 
BAPCPA is necessary.  Congress enacted the BAPCPA after considering 
eight years of testimony and reports on increasingly prevalent fraud within 
the bankruptcy system.40  The legislation was intended to target both 
                                                           
 31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009). 
 32. Id. at R. 2.1. 
 33. Id. at R. 1.4(b). 
 34. Id. at R. 2.1. 
 35. See infra notes 37, 65–70 and accompanying text (citing and explaining the statutes 
passed by Congress and the specific challenges to them). 
 36. 541 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 130 S. Ct. 1324 
(2010). 
 37. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
 38. See Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 788 n.1 (observing that the Milavetz “client-plaintiffs are 
appearing on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated who desire to exercise 
their First Amendment rights with attorneys regarding bankruptcy information”); see also 
Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct:  Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones,  
90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1284 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court “has never squarely 
confronted” the First Amendment status of certain categories of speech, such as 
“professional advice to clients”). 
 39. Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 794. 
 40. For more detail on the BAPCPA’s origins, see Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and 
Democracy:  Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 
688–89 (2008) (noting that BAPCPA’s enactment was extremely controversial because it 
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debtors and attorneys who were perceived as abusing the bankruptcy 
laws.41  Among numerous amendments and additions to the federal 
Bankruptcy Code, the BAPCPA includes regulations applicable not only to 
debtors, but also to debt relief agencies, a term that has been construed by 
the majority of courts (and, ultimately, the Supreme Court in Milavetz) to 
include attorneys.42  These regulations include a prohibition on certain 
advice offered by an attorney to a debtor-client regarding the accumulation 
of additional debt in contemplation of bankruptcy43 and a disclosure that 
must be included in certain advertising by an attorney who offers 
bankruptcy-related advice stating as follows:  “We are a debt relief agency.  
We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code.”44 
The BAPCPA establishes penalties for the violation of these provisions.  
The penalties include voidance of any contract failing to comply with the 
Act’s provisions, attorney liability to the debtor for actual damages and 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and enforcement by the state attorney 
general or similar official for injunctive relief or monetary damages.45  
Shortly after the enactment of the BAPCPA, the Milavetz plaintiffs—two 
attorneys, their law firm, and two clients—filed a lawsuit against the 
federal government challenging the application of the debt relief agency 
classification to attorneys, as well as the advice prohibition and the 
mandatory advertising disclosures. 
Regarding the advice prohibition, the parties recognized that the level of 
First Amendment protection afforded to attorney advice is unclear.  The 
plaintiffs argued for strict scrutiny because the BAPCPA’s prohibition on 
                                                           
was a result of lobbying by some of the nation’s leading consumer credit providers).  Those 
lobbying the bill allegedly invested more than $40 million in their efforts.  Id. at 689.  
 41. According to the legislative record, a primary purpose of the BAPCPA is to address 
“misconduct by attorneys and other professionals” and “abusive practices by consumer 
debtors who, for example, knowingly load up with credit card purchases or recklessly obtain 
cash advances and then file for bankruptcy relief.”  H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 5, 15 (2005) 
(internal quotation omitted), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92, 101. 
 42. The BAPCPA defines the term “debt relief agency” as “any person who provides 
any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other 
valuable consideration.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2006).  At least six courts in addition to the 
Eighth Circuit in Milavetz have so held.  See, e.g., Hersh v. United States ex rel. Mukasey, 
553 F.3d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that attorneys are included in the term “debt 
relief agency”) cert. denied, No. 08-1174, 2010 WL 1005956, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2010); 
see also Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 790 (citing five federal district court cases holding that 
attorneys are debt relief agencies and two holding the opposite) (citations omitted).   
 43. The BAPCPA provides in pertinent part that “[a] debt relief agency shall not . . . 
advise an assisted person or prospective assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation 
of such person filing [for bankruptcy].”  11 U.S.C. § 526 (a)(4) (2006).  
 44. Id. at §§ 528(a)(4),(b)(2)(B).  The BAPCPA requires the disclosure (or something 
substantially similar) in any advertisement for “bankruptcy assistance services” or 
referencing “the benefits of bankruptcy” or any advertisement regarding “assistance with 
respect to credit defaults, mortgage foreclosures, eviction proceedings, excessive debt, debt 
collection pressure, or inability to pay any consumer debt.”  Id. at §§ 528(a)(3), (b)(2)(B).   
 45. See id. at §§ 526(c)(1)–(3), (5) (explaining how the penalties are triggered). 
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bankruptcy-related advice is content-based.46  The government disagreed, 
suggesting instead that the court apply a more lenient standard applicable to 
attorney ethics regulations.47  A divided Eighth Circuit panel avoided the 
question of the applicable standard of review.  Instead the court found that 
under any standard the provision was “unconstitutionally overbroad”48 in 
that it not only prohibited unlawful advice (as the government suggested)49 
but also “advice constituting prudent prebankruptcy planning that is not an 
attempt to circumvent, abuse, or undermine the bankruptcy laws.”50  
Furthermore, the court found that the advice prohibition “prevents 
attorneys from fulfilling their duty to clients to give them appropriate and 
beneficial advice.”51  The debtor-client’s right to receive such advice was 
not addressed explicitly in the court’s determination. 
As for the mandatory advertising disclosures, the Milavetz plaintiffs 
claimed that the disclosures violated the First Amendment rights of 
attorneys by compelling speech.52  They also argued that the general public 
is likely to be confused by an advertisement for a “debt relief agency” that 
does not distinguish attorneys from non-attorneys, and that the disclosure 
requirement is overbroad, if not inaccurate, because the disclosure is 
mandated for any attorney who might give bankruptcy advice, even on an 
occasional or incidental basis, and for all advertising regardless of whether 
it mentions bankruptcy or is deceptive.53  The government, for its part, 
                                                           
 46. See Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 792 (citing Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 
642 (1994)).  Strict scrutiny requires the government to demonstrate a compelling interest in 
regulating the speech at issue and to employ the least restrictive means possible.  Id. 
 47. See id. at 793 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)).  The 
standard established in the Gentile case “balance[s] the First Amendment rights of the 
attorneys against the government’s legitimate interest in regulating the activity in 
question—the prohibition of advising assisted persons to incur more debt in contemplation 
of bankruptcy—and then determine[s] whether the regulations impose ‘only narrow and 
necessary limitations on lawyers’ speech.’”  Id. (quoting Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075).   
 48. Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 793.   
 49. The court observed:   
According to the government, [this section] should be interpreted as merely 
preventing an attorney from advising [a debtor-client] to take on more debt in 
contemplation of bankruptcy when the incurrence of such debt is done with the 
intent to manipulate the bankruptcy system, engage in abusive conduct, or take 
unfair advantage of the bankruptcy discharge. 
Id. 
 50. Id.  As examples of such prudent (and lawful) planning, the court listed mortgage 
refinancing to “free up additional funds to pay off other debts,” and the purchase of “a 
reliable automobile before filing for bankruptcy, so that the debtor will have dependable 
transportation to travel to and from work.”  Id. at 794. 
 51. Id. at 793. 
 52. See id. at 794–95 (showing that the First Amendment encompasses both the right to 
speak freely as well as the right to refrain from speaking). 
 53. See id. at 796–97 (dismissing the attorneys’ concerns that the required disclosures 
would confuse the general public because nothing in the Code prohibits attorneys from 
affirmatively identifying themselves as attorneys in addition to identifying themselves as a 
debt relief agency).  
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“contend[ed] that Congress enacted [the] disclosure requirements to 
address problems with deceitful or unclear advertising by bankruptcy 
attorneys.”54  Although restrictions on non-deceptive advertising are 
typically reviewed under intermediate scrutiny (the level that the district 
court applied in finding the disclosures unconstitutional), the Eighth Circuit 
followed the government’s position and applied the test used by the 
Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio,55 employing a rational basis review to uphold the 
disclosure requirements because they were intended to avoid potentially 
deceptive advertising.56  Both sides petitioned the Supreme Court for 
review and the appeals were consolidated.57 
The Supreme Court upheld the Eighth Circuit’s determination that 
lawyers are debt relief agencies and that the advertising disclosure 
requirements are constitutional, but reversed the finding of overbreadth on 
the advice ban.58  Justice Sotomayor, writing the unanimous opinion, 
explained: 
After reviewing these competing claims, we are persuaded that a 
narrower reading . . . is sounder, although we do not adopt precisely the 
view the Government advocates.  The Government’s sources show that 
the phrase “in contemplation of” bankruptcy has so commonly been 
associated with abusive conduct that it may readily be understood to 
prefigure abuse. . . . [W]e think the phrase refers to a specific type of 
misconduct designed to manipulate the protections of the bankruptcy 
system . . . [and] conclude that [it] prohibits a debt relief agency [or 
attorney] only from advising a debtor to incur more debt because the 
debtor is filing for bankruptcy, rather than for a valid purpose.
59
 
The Court explicitly declined, however, to “consider whether the statute so 
construed withstands First Amendment scrutiny,”60 leaving open the 
question of whether the advice given by an attorney warrants constitutional 
free speech protections.61  Justice Sotomayor went on to observe that “it is 
hard to see how a rule that narrowly prohibits an attorney from 
affirmatively advising a client to commit this type of abusive prefiling 
conduct could chill attorney speech or inhibit the attorney-client 
                                                           
 54. Id. at 795. 
 55. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 56. See Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 796 (concluding that a lower level of review was 
appropriate because the disclosure requirements were only intended to prevent potentially 
deceptive advertising and not legitimate and constitutionally protected advertising). 
 57. See United States v. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., 129 S. Ct. 2769 (2009) 
(noting that the case is consolidated). 
 58. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1341 (2010). 
 59. Id. at 1335–36 (2010). 
 60. Id. at 1339. 
 61. The Court declined to reach the First Amendment issue because the Court read the 
statute narrowly, and as such the issue had not been properly raised by the parties below.  Id. 
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relationship.”62  Nevertheless, the result of Milavetz endorses a ban on legal 
advice, leaving at least some lawyers to reach a different conclusion.  They 
speculate that this result will have a chilling effect on attorney advice and 
will inhibit the attorney-client relationship.63 
b. Attorney advice as expert advice and amicus advocacy:  Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project 
A second federal ban on the guidance that attorneys may give to their 
clients was challenged in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.64  While 
this case touched on a range of concerns well beyond the law of lawyering, 
certain provisions of the federal law at issue may be read to constrain the 
advice lawyers give to clients.  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act65 and its amendment, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act,66 criminalize “expert advice or assistance”67 given to any 
group designated as “a foreign terrorist organization”68 even if such support 
is for lawful, nonviolent activities or humanitarian efforts.69  “Expert advice 
or assistance” is defined as “scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge,” which includes legal advice.70 
This prohibition was attacked by the Humanitarian Law Project and a 
retired administrative law judge, among others, who sought to provide 
support to the Kurdistan Workers Party and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam for nonviolent and lawful peace-making activities.71  This proffered 
support included “offer[ing] their legal expertise in negotiating peace 
agreements.”72  The Ninth Circuit pointed out that, “[a]t oral argument, the 
government stated that filing an amicus brief in support of a foreign 
terrorist organization would violate [the] prohibition against providing 
‘expert advice or assistance.’”73  Accordingly, the court held that the “other 
                                                           
 62. Id. at 1338.  
 63. See, e.g., infra notes 384–85 and accompanying text.   
 64. 552 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010).  This case 
was subsequently consolidated with Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 49 
(2009). 
 65. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 66. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C). 
 67. Id. at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) (2006). 
 68. ADEPA, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006). 
 69. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 552 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(challenging ADEPA and its IRTPA amendment because it barred plaintiffs from providing 
material support to organizations AEDPA designated as foreign terrorist organizations, even 
though the support was for “nonviolent and lawful activities” of the organization). 
 70. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3). 
 71. Humanitarian Law Project, 552 F.3d at 921. 
 72. Id. at 921 n.1. 
 73. Id. at 930.  On brief to the Supreme Court, however, amici in support of the 
government suggested otherwise.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae Scholars, Attorneys, and 
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specialized knowledge” portion of the prohibition on “expert advice or 
assistance” language was void for vagueness as applied because it 
“cover[ed] constitutionally protected advocacy.”74  The Ninth Circuit 
justified its position by reasoning that the “requirement for clarity is 
enhanced when criminal sanctions are at issue or when the statute abuts 
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms.”75  
On petition to the Supreme Court, Attorney General Holder made the 
case that the provisions are not vague and, “in any event . . . regulate[] 
conduct, not speech, and do[] not violate the First Amendment.”76  In 
opposition, the Humanitarian Law Project argued that the speech at issue is 
“pure political speech”—namely “to lobby Congress, to teach and advise 
on human rights, to promote peaceful resolution of political disputes, and to 
advocate for the human rights of minority populations”—deserving of “the 
First Amendment’s highest protection.”77  Further, they countered that the 
“‘expert advice’ provisions criminalize speech on the basis of its content,” 
and maintained that the Ninth Circuit’s determination should be affirmed.78 
The Supreme Court, however, rejected “the extreme positions”79  
advanced by both sides.  In Chief Justice Roberts’s words, writing for the 
6-3 majority, “[t]he First Amendment issue before [the Court] is more 
refined than either plaintiffs or the Government would have it.”80  The 
majority rejected outright the Government’s conduct characterization,81 as 
well as the plaintiffs’ pure political speech claim.  Instead, the Court 
determined that “[t]he law here may be described as directed at conduct . . . 
but as applied to plaintiffs the conduct triggering coverage under the statute 
                                                           
Former Public Officials with Experience in Terrorism-Related Issues In Support of 
Petitioners at 26 n.9, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, Nos. 08-1498, 09-89 (U.S. Dec. 
23, 2009) (“The government was incorrect in arguing below that submitting an amicus brief 
on a [foreign terrorist organization’s] behalf would be prohibited [as] ‘expert advice or 
assistance’ under the statute.”).  They further argued that “the statute’s content-neutral 
licensing provision [under 31 C.F.R. § 597.505(a)] allows legal advice and representation.” 
See id. at 4.  But at oral argument, Solicitor General Elena Kagan maintained the 
government’s position that the statute bars legal advice and representation such as the filing 
of an amicus brief.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, Nos. 08-1498, 09-89 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2010) (arguing that while the statute does not 
bar a petitioner from drafting an amicus brief for a case involving an organization prohibited 
by the statute, it does bar a petitioner from drafting such a brief for the organization itself). 
 74. Humanitarian Law Project, 552 F.3d at 930. 
 75. Id. at 928 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). 
 76. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, Nos. 08-
1498, 09-89 (U.S. June 4, 2009). 
 77. Opening Br. for Humanitarian Law Project, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
Nos. 08-1498, 09-89 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2009). 
 78. Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, Nos. 08-1498, 09-89 (U.S. June 6, 2009) (internal punctuation omitted). 
 79. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010). 
 80. Id. at. 2724. 
 81. See id. at 2723 (“The Government is wrong that the only thing actually at issue in 
this litigation is conduct.”). 
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consists of communicating a message.”82  As such, “a more demanding 
standard”83 of review is warranted, though the Court did not specifically 
characterize the test applied as one of strict scrutiny.84 
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the ban as applied to the 
plaintiffs in the limited circumstances of (1) training how to use 
humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes; and (2) 
teaching how to petition various representative bodies like the United 
Nations.85  The Court left open the possibility that engaging in political 
advocacy on behalf of groups like the Kurds and the Tamil Tigers would 
violate the law as well, but found that the proposed advocacy was “phrased 
at such a high level of generality that [the plaintiffs] cannot prevail in this 
preenforcement challenge.”86 
Upholding the ban, the majority noted that “[e]veryone agrees that the 
Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the 
highest order,” and found significant both Congress’s “specific findings 
regarding the serious threat posed by international terrorism” as well as  the 
Executive Branch’s conclusion in an affidavit that “the experience and 
analysis of Government agencies charged with combating terrorism 
strongly support Congress’s finding that all contributions to foreign 
terrorist organizations . . . further those groups’ terrorist activities.”87  In a 
strongly worded dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor, wrote: 
[T]he Government has not made the strong showing necessary to justify 
under the First Amendment the criminal prosecution of those who 
engage in . . . communication and advocacy of political ideas and lawful 
means of achieving political ends. . . . That this kind of speech and 
association for political purposes is the kind of activity to which the First 
Amendment ordinarily offers its strongest protection is elementary.
88
 
Moreover, Justice Breyer pointed out that “the First Amendment protects 
advocacy even of unlawful action so long as that advocacy is not ‘directed 
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,’”89 and “[n]o one 
                                                           
 82. Id. at 2724. 
 83. Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)). 
 84. See id. at 2734 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also discussion of strict scrutiny, supra 
n. 46  Whether the Court created a new level of scrutiny for speech restrictions involving 
national defense or war on terrorism concerns has been the subject of speculation by 
commentators.  See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Humanitarian Law Project and Strict Scrutiny 
(June 21, 2010), available at http://volokh.com/2010/06/21/ humanitarian-law-project-and-
strict-scrutiny/. 
 85.  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. at 2729.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 2710 (internal punctuation and citations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 2732 (emphasis in original, citations omitted). 
 89. Id. at 2733 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) ) 
(emphasis in original) 
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contends that the plaintiffs’ speech to these organizations can be prohibited 
as incitement.”90 
Chief Justice Robert was careful to make clear that the holding in 
Humanitarian Law Project should not be understood “to say that any future 
applications of the material-support statute to speech or advocacy will 
survive First Amendment scrutiny.”91  He further cautioned that the opinion 
does not “address the resolution of more difficult cases that may arise 
under the statute in the future.”92  Thus, the Court did not rule specifically 
on the ban’s application to legal advice or amicus advocacy.  The holding 
of this case, however, is likely to have a chilling effect on attorney advice, 
as Justice Breyer suggested in his dissent: 
It is inordinately difficult to distinguish when speech activity will and 
when it will not initiate the chain of causation the Court suggests—a 
chain that leads from peaceful advocacy to “legitimacy” to increased 
support for the group to an increased supply of material goods that 
support its terrorist activities.  Even were we to find some such line of 
distinction, its application would seem so inherently uncertain that it 
would often, perhaps always, “chill” protected speech beyond its 
boundary.
93
 
As in Milavetz, the Supreme Court’s treatment of this federal statutory 
constraint on attorney advice may very well have significant ramifications 
for lawyers and clients.  The results of these cases may have considerable 
repercussions for clients who need complete and accurate legal advice 
about bankruptcy or humanitarian aid efforts, and for their attorneys who 
are under ethical obligations to deliver that information.  The Supreme 
Court’s ruling in these cases also may adversely impact the ability of 
attorneys to offer advice in other areas of law, for an affirmation of these 
statutory restrictions on legal advice potentially emboldens Congress to 
impose similar restraints in other areas of law. 
The next three fee-shifting statute cases turn on a concern related to 
accessing legal advice—the availability of attorneys to provide advice. 
2. Access to legal representation via fee-shifting statutes 
Three attorneys’ fees cases decided by the Court bring to light another 
aspect of a client’s right or ability to access legal advice:  the availability of 
attorneys’ fees in cases where, absent a meaningful fee-shifting statute 
attached to the relief sought, potential clients would be left without a 
lawyer to take up their case.94  And, consequently, parties seeking 
                                                           
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 2730. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2736. 
 94. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 336 F. Appx. 332, 336 (4th Cir. 2009) (per 
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enforcement or redress would have no access to legal advice or meaningful 
legal representation.95 
The default standard for determining the payment of attorneys’ fees is 
the so-called American Rule, under which each side must bear its own 
expenses regardless of the outcome.96  Fee-shifting statutes alter the default 
rule, requiring the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s expenses.97  
The purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to encourage private citizens to 
vindicate important public rights that otherwise might go unaddressed due 
to an inability to cover the attorneys’ fees and costs involved.  Congress 
has employed fee-shifting statutes since the mid-1960s to ensure the 
enforcement of civil rights statutes98 and has attached them to other 
important social and economic statutes as well.99 
As Professor Samuel Bagenstos explains, “[s]tatutes shifting 
responsibility for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees to unsuccessful defendants are 
central to ensuring access to justice for people of limited means in civil 
rights, environmental, and other public interest cases.”100  Professor 
                                                           
curiam) (clarifying the requirements for fee-shifting), rev’d and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2149, 
2156 (2010); Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008) (determining entitlement 
for fee-shifting statutes), rev’d and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2524 (2010); Kenny A. ex. 
rel Winn v. Purdue, 532 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir. 2008) (determining when fee award 
may be enhanced), rev’d and remanded 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1669 (2010). 
 95. Unless, of course, they are fortunate enough to receive assistance from a community 
legal aid organization, law school clinic, or pro bono representation.  These resources, 
however, are insufficient to satisfy the growing unmet need for legal services, especially for 
enforcement of civil rights and economic benefit statutes.  See, for example, Quintin 
Johnstone,  An Overview of the Legal Profession in the United States, how that Profession 
Recently has been Changing, and Its Future Prospects, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 771–72 
(2008), explaining:   
The main reason for the extensive lack of legal services for the poor and the 
frequent inadequacy of many of the legal services that are provided the poor is the 
insufficient funding of these services by both government and private sources.  
The total annual amount of funding for civil legal services for the poor in the 
United States as of 2005 was about 1 billion dollars a year, of which the federal 
government contribution was about thirty percent of the total amount, the state 
government contribution was about seven percent, and the remainder came from 
other public and private sources.   
 96. See Walter Olson, Loser Pays, POINT OF LAW, May 21, 2005, http:// 
www.pointoflaw.com/loserpays/overview.php (asserting that the United States is the only 
western democracy that still requires each side to pay their own expenses, and arguing for 
the abandonment of this requirement in favor of a rule that requires the loser to pay 
litigation cost). 
 97. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce [civil 
rights laws], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”). 
 98. See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:  Hostility to Litigation as an 
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1136 
(2006) (detailing Congress’ abandonment of the American Rule in civil rights cases).  
 99. See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 11, Perdue v. Kenny A. ex. rel. Winn,  
130 S. Ct. 1662 (2009) (No. 08-970) (citation omitted) (recognizing that there are “at least 
one hundred federal fee-shifting statutes that allow the prevailing party to recover a 
reasonable attorney’s fee from the losing party”). 
 100. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Thurgood Marshall, Meet Adam Smith:  How Fee-Shifting 
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Bagenstos notes several advantages of fee-shifting for these kinds of cases:  
“[b]ecause lawyers in fee-shifting cases get paid only when they win, they 
have an incentive to find and bring cases in which a court is likely to 
conclude that someone’s legal rights  
were actually violated.”101  The decentralizing feature of fee-shifting 
statutes, he points out, means that: 
Public funding or employment of lawyers for less well-off person[s] 
places them at the whim of government decisions about what sorts of 
clients should be represented, what sorts of litigation should be brought, 
what sorts of remedies should be sought, and so forth.  But a fee-shifting 
system equally subsidizes litigation for any violation of legal rights 
covered by a fee-shifting statute—whether or not the particular client or 
case is likely to be politically popular.  And unlike systems of public 
financing of litigation—whose costs are borne by taxpayers generally—
fee-shifting statutes place the burden of financing access to justice 
squarely on those entities that have actually violated the law (at least in 
the first instance).
102
 
Realization of the benefits highlighted by Professor Bagenstos 
necessarily assumes that the fee-shifting statute is applied in a meaningful 
and robust way.  Historically, however, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
fee-shifting statutes narrowly, limiting the circumstances when attorneys’ 
fees must be paid103 and even allowing for fees to be completely negotiated 
away in a settlement.104  Most recently the Court held that a party is not a 
“prevailing party” for purposes of the fee award unless deemed such by 
judicial decree, even if all relief sought is obtained.105  As Professor 
Andrew Siegel concludes: 
                                                           
Statutes Provide a Market-Based System for Promoting Access to Justice (Though Some 
Judges Don’t Get It), 1 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working  
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 150, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1407275.  But not everyone agrees that fee-shifting statutes encourage access to 
justice.  For example, University of Calgary Law Professor Alice Wooley argues that a fee-
shifting statute can act as a barrier for an individual who has pro bono representation but 
does not have the ability to pay the other side’s  
attorneys’ fees if unsuccessful.  See Posting of Alice Wooley to Legal Ethics Forum, 
http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2010/01/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-another-
feeshifting-statute-case.html (Jan. 16, 2010, 09:34 EST). 
 101. Bagenstos, supra note 100, at 1. 
 102. Id. at 1–2. 
 103. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam) (holding that a 
declaratory judgment ordering a change in prison policies did not constitute a victory on 
which attorneys’ fees could be based where one co-plaintiff had already been released from 
prison and the other co-plaintiff had died); Hewitt v. Helms,  
482 U.S. 755, 759–60 (1987) (holding that an interlocutory ruling that one’s complaint 
should not have been dismissed does not render one a prevailing party for the purposes of 
attorneys’ fees). 
 104. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 720 (1986) (holding that a district court may 
refuse to award fees where the plaintiff waives them as part of a settlement). 
 105. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
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[B]y limiting the availability of fees to situations in which the plaintiff 
obtains a judicially enforceable judgment or decree that provides 
significant betterment of his condition (through substantial damages or a 
consequential injunction), the [Court] require[s] an attorney . . . to 
evaluate not only the underlying merits of the plaintiff’s claim but also 
such extraneous variables as the likelihood that the action will become 
moot, the possibility that relief will come through non-judicial channels, 
and the scope of any potential damage award.
106
 
The result is that an attorney may decline to accept even a highly 
meritorious case, therefore circumventing the congressional purpose behind 
enactment of the fee-shifting statute. 
The Court’s grant of certiorari to three cases in this category during the 
2009 term indicates an awareness of the significance that a fee-shifting 
statute may have on the realization of the underlying relief sought.  
Moreover, while each case addressed a different fee-shifting statute, fee-
shifting provisions generally are interpreted consistently107 so the outcomes 
of these cases potentially may have far-reaching results.108 
a. An attorney’s entitlement to the fee-shifting award:  Astrue v. 
Ratliff 
Astrue v. Ratliff
109 raised a basic, but important, question regarding 
attorneys’ fees and federal fee-shifting statutes:  does a fee award belong to 
the attorney or the client?  Attorney Catherine Ratliff “successfully 
represented two claimants in their efforts to receive benefits from the 
Social Security Administration.”110  After her victory, she requested 
payment of her fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act 
(“EAJA”).111  The EAJA is a federal fee-shifting statute that allows 
“prevailing parties” in civil actions against the United States to recover fees 
and other costs in certain cases.112  The district court granted Ratliff’s 
request, but the government reduced her award because of debt that her 
client owed the United States government.113  Ratliff challenged the 
                                                           
532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001) (finding, contrary to the majority of the circuits, that attorneys’ 
fees cannot be awarded under a catalyst theory—where the plaintiff achieves the desired 
outcome because the litigation led to a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct). 
 106. Siegel, supra note 98, at 1137.   
 107. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., 532 U.S. at 603 n.4 (stating that the Court 
approaches an assessment of such provisions with an understanding that “[they] have 
interpreted these fee-shifting provisions consistently.”). 
 108. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 109. Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded, Astrue v. 
Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2524 (2010). 
 110. Id. at 801. 
 111. Id.  The Equal Access to Justice Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006). 
 112. § 2412(a)(1). 
 113. Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 801.  At issue was a fee awarded in the amount of $2,239.35, all 
of which was offset by the government to satisfy the client’s pre-existing federal debt.  See 
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government’s action under the Fourth Amendment, arguing that it 
constituted an illegal seizure, but the district court held she lacked standing 
“because the fees were awarded to the parties, not their attorney.”114 
The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that “EAJA attorneys’ fees are 
awarded to the prevailing parties’ attorneys.”115  It did so in the face of 
contradictory precedent from other jurisdictions, in particular the Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits.116  The court noted, however, that the result was based 
upon controlling Eighth Circuit cases and “[w]ere [it] deciding this case in 
the first instance, [it might] well agree with [its] sister circuits.”117 
Predictably, in its petition for certiorari, the government argued that the 
Supreme Court should follow those courts holding that fees awarded to a 
prevailing party under the EAJA are property of the client, not the 
attorney.118  Ratliff countered that the Eighth Circuit correctly held 
attorneys are entitled to EAJA awards regardless of the government’s 
asserted right to collect debts the client owes.119  Further, she noted that the 
Eighth Circuit’s acknowledgement of an attorney’s “protectable property 
interest in an EAJA fee once it is awarded” was a position “find[ing] strong 
support in the long-established rule that an attorney’s interest in a fee for 
her efforts creates a lien allowing equitable tracing of funds that have been 
transferred to other creditors of the client.”120  Thus, it follows that “the 
attorney’s equitable lien is itself a property interest subject to constitutional 
protection against government confiscation,” irrespective of “who has the 
right to apply for an attorney fee . . . or even to receive it in the first 
instance.”121 
Ratliff also suggested the consequences of a reversal would leave few 
attorneys, if any, to assist Social Security claimants given the risk of 
receiving no compensation, “even in those cases where they not only 
succeed, but [also] where the government’s position was not . . . 
justified.”122  She argued that the purpose of fee-shifting statutes—“to 
encourage attorneys to take meritorious cases challenging government 
action and thereby allow even the indigent to enforce the rule of law—is 
satisfied only if an attorney who earns a fee receives it.”123  The absence of 
                                                           
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, Astrue v. Ratliff, No. 08-1322 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2009). 
 114. Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 801. 
 115. Id. at 802. 
 116. Id. at 801–02 (citing cases). 
 117. Id. at 801–02. 
 118. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 113, at 7. 
 119. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 21, Astrue v. Ratliff, No. 08-1322 (U.S. June 
25, 2009). 
 120. Id. at 22. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 29. 
 123. Respondent’s Brief at 39, Astrue v. Ratliff, No. 08-1322 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2010). 
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a guaranteed fee for successful representation translates into an absence of 
lawyers to undertake the representation. 
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding unanimously that an EAJA fee 
award belongs to the client, not the attorney.124  As such, the fee award can 
be seized by the federal government to satisfy the client’s debt 
obligation.125  Justice Thomas authored the opinion, explaining that a 
textual reading of the statue makes clear “that courts shall award to a 
prevailing party fees and other expenses.”126  Further, he noted that the 
Court has “long held that the term ‘prevailing party’ in fee statutes is a term 
of art that refers to the prevailing litigant,” not the litigant’s attorney.127 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, wrote a 
separate concurring opinion, acknowledging the concerns raised by 
Ratliff.128  While Justice Sotomayor agreed that fees awarded under the 
EAJA are payable to the litigant rather than the attorney, and that “the 
litigant’s obligation to pay her attorney is controlled not by the EAJA but 
by contract and the law governing that contract,” she observed that “it is 
likely both that Congress did not consider that question and that, had it 
done so, it would not have wanted EAJA fee awards to be subject to 
offset.”129  In particular, she criticized the offset as “undercut[ting] the 
effectiveness of the EAJA” and suggested that Congress “perhaps will in 
the future make the opposite choice.”130  In short, she wrote:  “[t]he EAJA’s 
admirable purpose will be undercut if lawyers fear that they will never 
actually receive attorney’s fees to which a court has determined the 
prevailing party is entitled.  The point of an award of attorney’s fees, after 
all, is to enable a prevailing litigant to pay her attorney.”131 
b. Revisiting the prevailing party requirement for fee-shifting 
statutes:  Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.  
A second fee-shifting statute case sought clarification about the 
prevailing party requirement.  In Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance 
Co., 132 the plaintiff’s attorney successfully represented Hardt in obtaining 
the relief she sought—a reversal by Reliance of its initial decision to deny 
                                                           
 124. Astre v. Ratliff, 130S. Ct. 2521, 2524 (2010) (“We hold that a § 2412(d) award is 
payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-
existing debt that the litigant owes the United States.”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 2525 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). 
 127. Id. (internal punctuation and citation omitted). 
 128. Id. at 2529–33. 
 129. Id. at 2530. 
 130. Id. at 2530 (internal punctuation omitted). 
 131. Id.  
 132. 336 F. Appx. 332 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), rev’d and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 
2149, 2156 (2010). 
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her long-term disability benefits for carpal tunnel syndrome.133  The district 
court granted her motion, observing that because “on remand, Hardt 
received precisely the benefits she had sought, she meets the definition of a 
prevailing party and is eligible for an award of attorney’s fees” in the 
amount of nearly $40,000.134 
Significantly, there was no judgment on the merits or judicially 
sanctioned relief.  Thus, Reliance argued “that at best, this is a case of 
‘tactical mooting,’” with no judgment on the merits entitling the plaintiff to 
fees.135  In other words, there was no prevailing party.  On appeal, the 
Fourth Circuit agreed with Reliance.136 
The Fourth Circuit held that Hardt was not a prevailing party, and 
reversed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees under ERISA § 
502(g)(1).137  Hardt appealed to the Supreme Court, presenting two 
questions:  first, “whether . . . a district court [has] discretion to award 
reasonable attorney’s fees only to a prevailing party;” and second, “whether 
a party is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to [the ERISA statute] when 
she . . . secures a judicially ordered remand . . . and subsequently receives 
the relief sought.”138  Hardt argued that attorneys would be reluctant to 
represent future ERISA plaintiffs in pursuit of their rightful entitlements if 
denied fees in situations like this.139 
And this time the Court agreed, holding that under the ERISA fee-
shifting statue, “a court in its discretion may award fees and costs to either 
party as long as the fee claimant has achieved some degree of success on 
the merits.”140  Justice Thomas authored another unanimous opinion, and 
again followed a textual reading of the fee-shifting statute.  Because the 
term “prevailing party” does not appear in the ERISA fee-shifting statute, 
the Court declined to incorporate this requirement.141  Instead, the statute 
requires only “some success on the merits,” under which the Court found 
that “the District Court properly exercised its discretion to award Hardt 
attorney’s fees in this case.”142 
                                                           
 133. Id. at 333 (describing the condition as so severe that Hardt could no longer continue 
to work as an administrative assistant). 
 134. Id. at 334. 
 135. Id. at 336. 
 136. Id. at 336. 
 137. Id. at 333. 
 138. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i–ii, Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 
09-448 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2009). 
 139. Brief for Petitioner at 33, Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 09-448 
(U.S. Oct. 14, 2009). 
 140. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2156(2010) (internal 
punctuation and citation omitted). 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 2159 (citations omitted). 
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The third fee-shifting statute case heard by the Court involved a similar 
concern regarding the reluctance of attorneys to take on difficult but worthy 
cases when the fee award is uncertain. 
c. Enhancing fee-shifting awards for extra effort:  Perdue v. Kenny 
A. ex rel. Winn 
The third fee-shifting case, Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn,143  
examined when, if ever, an award under a federal fee-shifting statute may 
“be enhanced based solely on quality of performance and results obtained, 
or [whether] these factors already are included in the lodestar 
calculation.”144  The default standard for calculating a fee award is based 
upon the lodestar formula, a tool applied by courts to assess an appropriate 
compensation award for attorneys representing the prevailing party under a 
fee-shifting statute.145  The formula multiplies the reasonable number of 
hours worked on a case by a reasonable hourly rate that reflects the skill 
and experience of the attorneys seeking the fee award, and a court may 
enhance the lodestar calculation on the basis of performance and results 
only in exceptional circumstances.146 
This case stemmed from a Georgia federal district court’s award of $10.5 
million to a group of attorneys who represented a class of 3,000 foster 
children against the State of Georgia in constitutional and statutory 
challenges directed toward the foster care system for  
two metropolitan Atlanta counties.147  Of that award, $4.5 million 
represented an enhancement to the lodestar calculation.148  The 
enhancement, or bonus, was based upon the district court’s assessment that 
the quality of legal representation “was far superior to what consumers of 
                                                           
 143. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1296–97 (N.D. Ga. 2006), 
aff’d, 532 F.3d 1209, 1214–15, 1242 (11th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded  
130 S. Ct. 1662, 1669 (2010). 
 144. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at i, Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 
1662 (2010) (No. 08-970) (emphasis added). 
 145. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1673 (explaining that the lodestar formula attempts to 
compensate attorneys in fee-shifting cases in line with market rates). 
 146. See id. at 1672–73.  Reasonableness is assessed by a number of factors including:   
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) 
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of 
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; 
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client 
or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the 
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the 
case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and 
(12) awards in similar cases. 
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3 (1983). 
 147. 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1669 (2010). 
 148. See Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1670 (explaining that the lodestar fee of $6,012,802.90 
should be adjusted upward by a multiplier of 1.75, resulting in a total fee award of over 
$10.5 million). 
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legal services in the legal marketplace in Atlanta could reasonably expect 
to receive for the rates used in the lodestar calculation,”149 or in other 
words, the quality of performance and the results obtained.  The district 
court judge based the fee award on his belief that the resolution of the 
foster care class action was unprecedented in its success.150  The case 
spanned more than three years, concluding with a consent decree in which 
the State agreed to take thirty-one separate steps to improve the situation of 
foster children, including obligations such as prompt investigation of abuse 
or neglect reports, regular visits by caseworkers, licensing of foster homes, 
and timely delivery of medical and dental care.151 
The State of Georgia appealed the award but a unanimous panel of the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s award, though it did so with 
serious reservations.152  In particular, the court observed that the district 
court’s enhancement “cannot be squared with . . . Supreme Court 
[precedent],” and reached the “conclusion that the enhancement to the 
lodestar amount in this case was improper.”153  Nevertheless, “under the 
prior panel precedent rule [the court was] not free to decide the 
enhancement issue.”154  As such, though the court was “convinced” that the 
prior Eleventh Circuit precedent was “wrong and conflict[ed] with relevant 
Supreme Court decisions,” it felt “bound to follow it”155 and upheld the 
award.156  After the denial of a rehearing en banc,157 the State petitioned for 
review. 
                                                           
 149. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1288.  The District Court further observed that “[a]fter 
58 years as a practicing attorney and federal judge, th[is] Court is unaware of any other case 
in which a plaintiff class has achieved such a favorable result on such a comprehensive 
scale.”  Id. at 1290. 
 150. See id. at 1290 (recounting the court’s investigatory actions that led to the lodestar 
calculation’s multiplication by 1.75).   
 151. Id. at 1289; see also Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 99, at 4–6 
(discussing the volume of hours spent by counsel preparing for and mediating the case). 
 152. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 532 F.3d at 1242.  Among those reservations the court noted 
that  
[t]he multi-million dollar enhancement, over and beyond the full lodestar sum . . . 
amounts to an involuntary, federal court ordered contribution from the taxpayers of 
Georgia to a non-profit organization.  The perverse irony of the seven figure, court 
ordered gratuity in this case is that it reduces the amount of state funds available to 
care for [the children that the litigation sought to protect].   
Id. at 1236. 
 153. Id. at 1225, 1233. 
 154. Id. at 1236 (explaining that the court was constrained to following its earlier rulings 
in <AACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1331 (11th Cir. 1987) and <orman v. Housing 
Authority of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
 155. Id. at 1238 (citing Hurth v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857, 862 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are 
not permitted to reach a result contrary to a prior panel’s decision merely because we are 
convinced it is wrong . . . .”)). 
 156. Id. at 1242. 
 157. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 547 F.3d 1319, 1320 (2008). 
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In its petition to the Supreme Court, the State of Georgia argued that the 
results obtained in a case, and the quality of work done on a case, are 
considerations to be taken into account only when initially calculating the 
basic lodestar fee amount.158  It constitutes double-counting, so the 
argument goes, to consider those factors again in awarding an 
enhancement, bonus, or other additional amount.  The United States filed 
an amicus curiae brief in support of the State of Georgia, maintaining that: 
Enhancements based on the quality of representation or the results 
obtained are not necessary to satisfy the aim of fee-shifting statutes.  
Congress designed these statutes to enable private parties to attract 
competent counsel to help vindicate important federal rights, but 
Congress also cautioned that attorney’s fee awards should not produce 
windfalls.
159
 
Furthermore, “[i]n the rare case in which representation of an unpopular or 
otherwise highly controversial client causes counsel to suffer professional 
or financial harm, the lodestar amount may be insufficient and an 
enhancement appropriate.  But no such special circumstances are present in 
this case.”160  In support of this position, the United States pointed to 
Supreme Court precedent showing that the “Court has steadily distanced 
itself from the notion that an enhancement . . . may be based on quality of 
representation or results obtained, even in ‘exceptional’ cases.”161 
In response, the attorneys seeking enforcement of the fee award focused 
on the district court’s decision and the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of a 
rehearing en banc, in which Judge Wilson concurred.  He explained that 
“[s]everal decades of established Supreme Court precedent make it clear 
that district judges are vested with discretion to enhance a fee in 
accordance with a federal fee-shifting statute . . . when there is specific 
evidence in the record to support an exceptional result and superior 
                                                           
 158. See Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 99, at 13–14. 
 159. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9–10, Perdue 
v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2009) (No. 08-970). 
 160. Id. at 10. 
 161. Id. at 17 (discussing cases where the Court incorporated elements in a basic lodestar 
calculation that circuit courts were erroneously considering to be enhancements).  The 
government also noted that the ABA Model Rules require that “[a]n attorney who accepts a 
case arising under a fee-shifting statute is ethically obligated, as is any attorney in any case, 
to represent her client to the best of her legal ability,” regardless of compensation.  Id. at 29.  
Accordingly, “[p]ursuant to these professional norms, lawyers every day provide best efforts 
for fees similar to what respondents’ counsel would receive under the lodestar award, 
without any prospect of substantial monetary bonuses.”  Id.  Indeed, the lawyers in Perdue 
took on and successfully carried out their representation without any expectation of an 
enhancement.  See Tony Mauro & Marcia Coyle, Judges Back Fee Enhancements But Only 
in Rare Circumstances, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, April 22, 2010, http://www.law.com/ 
jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202448453777 (interviewing Marcia Robinson Lowry, 
executive director of Children’s Rights, Inc.—the group of lawyers representing the plaintiff 
class in Perdue—who explained “that fee enhancements like the one requested in this case 
are rare, occurring an average of once each year in the entire federal system”). 
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performance.”162  Judge Wilson concluded that Perdue “is that case,” and 
Judge Tjoflat emphasized in his own dissent that the district court provided 
precisely the sort of specific facts required to support an enhancement.163 
The Supreme Court held that an enhancement to an award under a fee-
shifting statute may be permitted “in extraordinary circumstances,” but 
reversed the $4.5 million bonus at issue in Perdue.164  Writing for the 5-4 
majority, Justice Alito explained: 
[T]here is a strong presumption that the lodestar is sufficient; factors 
subsumed in the lodestar calculation cannot be used as a ground for 
increasing an award above the lodestar; and a party seeking fees has the 
burden of identifying a factor that the lodestar does not adequately take 
into account and proving with specificity that an enhanced fee is 
justified.  Because the District Court did not apply these standards, we 
reverse . . . .
165
 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsberg, and Sotomayor, wrote 
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.166  Justice Breyer 
agreed with the majority’s conclusion that “when ‘superior attorney 
performance’ [] leads to ‘exceptional success an enhanced award may be 
justified.’”167  However, he would have held that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding the enhancement in this case, an issue 
“which lies beyond the narrow question that [the Court] agreed to 
consider.”168 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer reached the conclusion that the lower 
court’s original determination was not an abuse of discretion for four 
reasons, explaining:   
 First, the record indicates that the lawyers’ objective in this case was 
unusually important and fully consistent with the central objectives of 
the basic federal civil-rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. . . . 
 . . . . 
 Second, the course of the lawsuit was lengthy and arduous. . . . 
 Third, in the face of this opposition, the results obtained by the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to have been exceptional. . . . 
 Fourth and finally, the District Judge, who supervised these 
proceedings, who saw the plaintiffs amass, process, compile, and 
convincingly present vast amounts of factual information, who witnessed 
their defeat of numerous state procedural and substantive motions, and 
                                                           
 162. Respondents’ Brief at 12, Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2009) 
(No. 08-970) (quoting Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 547 F.3d at 1320 (Wilson, J., concurring)). 
 163. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 547 F.3d at 1321–22 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
 164. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. at 1678 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)). 
 168. Id. 
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who was in a position to evaluate the ultimate mediation effort, . . . 
[found, among other observations] “that . . . counsel brought a higher 
degree of skill, commitment, dedication, and professionalism to this 
litigation than the [district judge] ha[d] seen displayed by the attorneys in 
any other case during its 27 years on the bench.”
169
 
He also pointed out that the district court would not be prohibited “from 
awarding an enhanced fee on remand if that court provides more detailed 
reasoning supporting its decision.”170 
Compensation guaranteed by fee-shifting statutes undoubtedly 
influences attorneys to take on representations where parties otherwise 
would be left with no legal advice (and, in cases like these, with no 
assistance in obtaining wrongly-denied benefits).  Thus, in an important 
way, the attorneys’ fees cases intertwine with those cases addressing access 
to attorney advice and, in particular, the right or ability of clients to access 
necessary legal assistance.  Another case taken up by the Court this term 
identified comparable concerns regarding access to legal advice in a 
different context—the protection afforded to attorney-client privilege 
claims during civil trials. 
3. Preserving access to legal advice through the immediate appeal of a 
disputed attorney-client privilege waiver:  Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. 
Carpenter  
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter
171  involved a question of civil 
procedure, asking “whether a party has an immediate appeal [under the 
collateral order doctrine]172 of [a] district court’s order finding waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege and compelling production of privileged 
materials.”173  The Supreme Court took up the case to reconcile a circuit 
split and held that such a party does not have a right to an immediate 
appeal.174  Rather, the Court observed, “[p]ostjudgment appeals, together 
with other review mechanisms, suffice to protect the rights of litigants and 
preserve the vitality of the attorney-client privilege.”175 
This case was sparked by a dispute between Mohawk Industries and its 
employee, Norman Carpenter, who alleged that he was terminated 
unlawfully after reporting to Mohawk’s human resources department that 
                                                           
 169. Id. at 1679–1682 (citation omitted). 
 170. Id. at 1684. 
 171. 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009). 
 172. The collateral order doctrine provides for an immediate appeal in limited situations.  
See infra notes 181–183 and accompanying text.   
 173. Reply Brief at 1, Mohawk Indus., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678). 
 174. Carpenter v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 541 F.3d 1048, 1050 (11th Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam), aff’d, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009). 
 175. Id. 
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several temporary employees were illegal aliens.176  During the course of 
discovery, Carpenter requested information from a meeting that took place 
between Mohawk’s attorney and him in an unrelated case, as well as 
information about Mohawk’s decision to terminate his employment.177  
Mohawk refused to provide the documents on the basis of attorney-client 
privilege, leading Carpenter to move to compel discovery.178  While the 
district court agreed “that the communications at issue were protected by 
the attorney-client privilege . . . it went on to conclude that [Mohawk] had 
implicitly waived the attorney-client privilege due to the response [it] filed 
in [an unrelated] action.”179  Mohawk, believing it had not waived the 
privilege, sought an appeal of the decision based upon the collateral order 
doctrine.180 
The Supreme Court set forth the collateral order doctrine in Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
181  The doctrine provides an exception to 
the final judgment rule and the corresponding principle that “[g]enerally, 
discovery orders are not final orders . . . for purposes of obtaining appellate 
jurisdiction.”182  Thus, “[u]nder Cohen, an order is appealable [only] if it 
(1) conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) resolves an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) is 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”183 
While the Eleventh Circuit found the first two prongs satisfied in this 
case, regarding the third prong it found “that a discovery order that 
implicates the attorney-client privilege is [not] effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.”184  For example, the court explained that,  
If [it] were to determine on appeal from a final judgment that privileged 
information was wrongly turned over and was used to the detriment of the 
party asserting the privilege, [it] could reverse any adverse judgment and 
require a new trial, forbidding any use of the improperly disclosed 
information, as well as any documents, witnesses, or other evidence 
obtained as a consequence of the improperly disclosed information.185 
Acknowledging that other circuits have reached an opposite result, the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that a discovery order compelling the 
disclosure of privileged information cannot be appealed before final 
                                                           
 176. 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009). 
 177. Id. at 1051. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1052. 
 181. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).   
 182. Mohawk, 541 F.3d at 1052. 
 183. Id. at 1052 (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
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judgment.186  Instead, the court suggested that mandamus or a challenge to 
a contempt order following noncompliance might provide alternative 
mechanisms for review,187 notwithstanding the practical difficulties 
associated with these options and the extraordinary costs involved with a 
new trial.188 
In its brief to the Supreme Court, petitioner Mohawk focused on the 
importance of the attorney-client privilege in the context of the justice 
system, an issue glossed over in the Eleventh Circuit opinion.  Mohawk 
explained: 
The attorney-client privilege lies at the heart of our adversary system, 
promotes loyalty and trust between attorney and client, and advances the 
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice.  Because the attorney-client privilege is deeply rooted in public 
policy and essential to achieving a healthy legal system, a district court 
order that compromises the privilege by compelling the disclosure of 
privileged information threatens rights critical to the public good and is 
sufficiently important to warrant collateral order jurisdiction, 
outweighing the traditional concerns of piecemeal appeals.
189
 
Moreover, Mohawk reasoned that if it was forced “to wait until after a final 
judgment to appeal the District Court’s order, the right Mohawk seeks to 
protect, namely, the right not to disclose privileged information, will have 
been destroyed.  It is this right of non-disclosure that is at the heart of the 
attorney-client privilege . . . .”190  Mohawk went on to clarify that, “as the 
Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have recognized, an appeal after final 
judgment cannot remedy the breach of confidentiality occasioned by 
erroneous disclosure of privileged material.  Once the privileged 
information is disclosed, ‘there is no way to unscramble the egg scrambled 
by the disclosure.’”191  For example, adverse parties “cannot unlearn what 
has been disclosed to them,”192 and “allowing an adversary to see 
                                                           
 186. See id. at 1053 (listing cases from the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits that have held 
that the collateral order doctrine allows review of an order compelling the production of 
attorney-client communication, and cases from the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and 
Federal Circuits stating that it does not).   
 187. Id. at 1054–55. 
 188. See, e.g., Michael P. Shea, Allow Prompt Appeals, NAT’L L. J., Apr. 13, 2009, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202429788127 (explaining that 
“mandamus—an extraordinary remedy reserved for ‘clear abuses of discretion’ by the trial 
judge—is a poor fit for orders denying privilege claims” and that the contempt order for 
non-compliance “is even worse” in that for most parties “enduring the penalties and stigma 
associated with a contempt sanction is simply not a feasible option”); see also Brief for 
Petitioner at 32–40, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009) (No. 08-678) 
(discussing problems associated with mandamus and contempt). 
 189. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 188188, at 10. 
 190. Id. at 11–12. 
 191. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 
 192. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner at 
15, Mohawk Indus., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678) (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 
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privileged documents that are later held inadmissible at retrial ‘may alert 
adversary counsel to evidentiary leads or give insights regarding various 
claims or defenses.’”193 
In his opposition brief, Carpenter pointed to precedent disallowing an 
immediate appeal of discovery orders, including privilege rulings, based 
upon the final judgment rule and concerns of judicial administration.194  
Applying the criteria for collateral order review, he argued that none of the 
factors were satisfied here for four reasons:  first, “privilege rulings are 
inconclusive because they are particularly subject to reconsideration;” 
second, they “are not completely separate from the merits;” third, 
“privilege claims are not important enough to overcome the final judgment 
rule;” and finally, “orders denying attorney-client privilege claims are not 
effectively unreviewable after final judgment.”195  Carpenter also made the 
case that allowing an immediate appeal would result in a flood of appeals, 
along with unnecessary delay in the trial process, if a party were to demand 
an immediate appeal any time the attorney-client privilege is invoked, even 
on the witness stand.196 
The Supreme Court agreed with Carpenter.197  For the Court, “the 
decisive consideration [wa]s whether delaying review until the entry of 
final judgment ‘would imperil a substantial public interest’ or ‘some 
particular value of a high order.’”198  The Court acknowledged Mohawk’s 
argument that attorney-client privilege is fundamental to ensuring 
confidential communications199 and even accepted Mohawk’s contentions 
about the need to fully protect privilege, observing that: 
                                                           
v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 193. Id. (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank, <.A., 964 F.2d at 165). 
 194. See Brief for Respondent at 10–11, Mohawk Indus., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 599  
(No. 08-678) (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court held that orders enforcing 
discovery requests are not suitable for immediate appeal because they are not “final 
order[s],” and that this rule holds true even for questions of privilege in cases that involve 
Constitutional rights, such as Fifth Amendment protections) (quoting Church of Scientology 
of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992)); see also id. at 11 (recognizing that the 
Supreme Court “has repeatedly cautioned against opening the door to appeals that would 
undermine ‘the deference owed by appellate courts to trial judges charged with managing 
the discovery process’”) (quoting Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 
209 (1999)). 
 195. Id. at 8–9. 
 196. Id. at 46.  But see Brief for Petitioner at 14, Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter,  
130 S. Ct. 599 (Jan. 20, 2010)(No. 08–678)(“[T]he available evidence shows that the three 
circuits that have allowed collateral order review of orders compelling the disclosure of 
information claimed to be subject to the attorney-client privilege have dealt with a total of 
approximately eleven such appeals since 1997.  Of these appeals, only three fell into the 
category at issue here. . . .”).   
 197. See Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 603 (holding that “disclosure orders adverse to the 
attorney-client privilege [do not] qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order 
doctrine”). 
 198. Id. at 605 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352–53 (2006)). 
 199. Id. at 606. 
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By assuring confidentiality, the privilege encourages clients to make full 
and frank disclosures to their attorneys, who are then better able to 
provide candid advice and effective representation.  This, in turn, serves 
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice.
200
 
The Court further recognized that some of the orders affecting attorney-
client privilege could influence litigation in such a way that could not be 
easily remedied by post-decision appeals.201 
But the alternative was not a result the Court could accept, for allowing 
parties to undertake piecemeal appeals of each adverse attorney-client 
ruling would unnecessarily delay resolution at the district court level and 
unduly burden the courts of appeals.202  Instead, the Court cited alternative 
measures  such as the ability of appellate courts to “vacat[e] an adverse 
judgment and remand[] for a new trial in which the protected material and 
its fruits are excluded from evidence,” and the reality that immediate 
review is already available for more serious privilege issues such as 
“[s]ection 1292(b) appeals, mandamus, and appeals from contempt 
citations.”203  The Court suggested that the decision to allow immediate 
appeals for orders affecting attorney-client privilege issues should come 
through the process of rulemaking because of “the opportunity for full 
airing it provides.”204 
These six cases focusing on access to lawyers and legal advice reveal a 
troubling pattern, one in which Congress and the Court place or allow 
limits on the ability of those most in need of legal representation to receive 
complete advice, assuming they are even able to obtain a lawyer.  In only 
one of the six decisions—Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance 
Company—did the result favorably encourage access to lawyers, and it is 
limited to the unique structure of the ERISA fee-shifting provision 
applicable in that case.  A similar pattern is seen in the remaining cases 
considered by the Court during the 2009 term as well, all of which touch on 
the consequences  
of bad lawyering.  A comparable denial of access to justice and legal 
representation may occur when a lawyer introduces false testimony, 
presents insufficient mitigating evidence, offers the wrong advice, misses a 
necessary filing deadline, or fails to request a limiting instruction. 
                                                           
 200. Id. (citations and internal punctuation omitted). 
 201. Id. at 608. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 606–08. 
 204. Id. at 609. 
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B. Cases Addressing Harm Caused by Bad Lawyering 
1. Prosecutors’ civil liability for fabricating evidence and introducing it 
at trial:  McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa 
McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa
205 could have fundamentally 
altered the law on prosecutorial immunity.  The Supreme Court never had 
an opportunity to rule on the case, however, because the parties reached a 
settlement soon after oral argument, and  
requested dismissal.206  Nevertheless, it is worth briefly exploring the 
background of this case because the Court has demonstrated an interest in 
resolving the issue presented and similar cases are likely to reappear again 
in the future.207  It is also important to consider the lawyering issues 
presented in this case because a sufficient number of justices found the case 
cert-worthy and, absent the parties’ self-imposed dismissal by settlement, 
the Court was prepared to issue an opinion on the merits. 
The case dates back to 1978, when two black teenagers, Curtis McGhee 
and Terry Harrington, were wrongfully convicted of murdering a white, 
retired Council Bluffs police department captain who was working as a 
night security guard.208  They were sentenced to life imprisonment.209  In 
2002, the Iowa Supreme Court found that the prosecutors coerced false 
testimony and failed to disclose evidence of an alternative suspect.210  The 
court reversed Harrington’s conviction, and McGhee entered a plea of 
second degree murder in exchange for a sentence of time served.211 
The two men then brought civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and the two former county 
prosecutors, Joseph Hrvol and David Richter, alleging that they fabricated 
                                                           
 205. 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008), appeal dismissed, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010). 
 206. Jessie Holland, Case Over Iowa Prosecutors’ Conduct is Settled, AP NEWS, Jan. 4, 
2010, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=1612107874 (“A 
multimillion-dollar settlement on Monday ended the Supreme Court’s consideration of a 
case that could have changed the legal protections that criminal prosecutors get as they do 
their jobs.  The high court agreed to dismiss the case after Terry Harrington and Curtis W. 
McGhee Jr. agreed to a $12 million settlement with Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and two of 
its former prosecutors.”). 
 207. Indeed, the Court already has granted certiorari to one such case. See Connick v. 
Thompson, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010) (challenging 
$14 million verdict against district attorney’s office for failure to train lawyers about Brady-
violations, a failure that led to the wrongful conviction and death sentence of accused 
murder John Thompson); but see Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Thoughts on Damages for 
Wrongful Convictions, 85 CHI. KENT L. REV. 127, 127–28 (2010) (dismissing the idea that 
defendants who were wrongfully convicted due to prosecutorial misconduct should be able 
to pursue monetary damages against the prosecutors, and arguing instead that the justice 
system should continue to rely on “political accountability” as the best deterrent against 
prosecutorial misconduct). 
 208. McGhee, 547 F.3d at 925; see also infra note 219. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id.  
 211. Id. 
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witness testimony, which they later used at trial, and withheld evidence by 
failing to disclose the existence of a key suspect.212  The prosecutors argued 
that they were entitled to absolute immunity under Imbler v. Pachtman,213 
in which the Supreme Court held that prosecutors are afforded absolute 
immunity at trial for their prosecutorial acts, but only qualified immunity 
for investigatory or administrative acts.214  The Court did not provide 
definitive guidance, however, as to what differentiates a prosecutorial 
activity from an investigatory or administrative activity.215 
The district court dismissed the claims against the prosecutors based on 
the withholding of exculpatory evidence, but denied immunity for the 
claims based on the allegations that the prosecutors coerced false testimony 
from witnesses and later introduced it at  
trial to obtain the convictions.216  The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that 
the prosecutors’ procurement of false testimony violated McGhee’s and 
Harrington’s right to substantive due process, and that the prosecutors were 
not entitled to immunity after they fabricated evidence and introduced it at 
trial.217  As McGhee and Harrington observed, “[w]ithout the fabricated 
testimony, there was no evidence connecting [the] plaintiffs to the 
murder.”218 
The former prosecutors petitioned the Supreme Court solely to address 
the question of whether they could be tried civilly and owe damages for 
wrongful conviction and incarceration for violating the defendants’ 
substantive due process rights by soliciting false testimony and introducing 
it at trial.219  Though the former prosecutors were careful to note that they 
                                                           
 212. Id. 
 213. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
 214. See id. at 430 (recognizing that when a prosecutor is performing an investigative or 
administrative role, the prosecutor is only entitled to “a good-faith defense comparable to [a] 
policeman’s”). 
 215. See id. at 430–31 (clarifying that the Court’s holding is limited to prosecutorial 
immunity under a § 1983 civil suit for damages). 
 216. See McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 475 F. Supp. 2d 862, 927–28 (S.D. 
Iowa 2007) (ordering in addition that Harrington’s and McGhee’s state claims, including 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and malicious prosecution, be dismissed to the 
extent they derived from “withholding of exculpatory evidence,” but not dismissed to the 
extent they derived from “arrest without probable cause and fabrication/coercion of 
evidence”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008), appeal dismissed, 
130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010). 
 217. McGhee, 547 F.3d at 932–33. 
 218. Brief in Opposition for Respondent Curtis W. McGhee, Jr. at 6, McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 
1047 (No. 08-1065) [hereinafter McGhee Opposition Brief]; accord Brief in Opposition for 
Respondent Terry J. Harrington at 10, McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (No. 08-1065) [hereinafter 
Harrington Opposition Brief]. 
 219. Brief for the Petitioners at i, McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (No. 08-1065).  McGhee and 
Harrington in their opposition briefs suggest that petitioners’ motivation was “[r]acial 
prejudice against [them] as African-Americans” and that petitioners “framed” them because 
they “wanted a conviction” and “they knew a white Council Bluffs jury would readily 
convict two black teenagers from across the Missouri River in Omaha, Nebraska for the 
KNAKE_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2010  10:44 AM 
2010]  INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE LAW OF LAWYERING 1533 
had not conceded McGhee and Harrington’s version of the facts,220 they did 
not dispute them in the appeal; rather, they made two arguments.  First, 
they contended that the Eighth Circuit’s decision stands in conflict with the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,221 that the 
procurement of false testimony does not violate the Constitution and that 
the prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for the use of such  
false testimony.222  Second, they suggested that the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision also conflicted with other Supreme Court precedent, particularly 
related to the Court’s “function test” for prosecutorial immunity.223  In sum, 
the two prosecutors made the case that they should enjoy absolute 
immunity from plaintiffs’ claims because the claims “go to the heart of a 
prosecutor’s function as an advocate for the state in judicial 
proceedings.”224 
In opposing the appeal, Harrington and McGhee both disputed the claim 
of a circuit split and distinguished Buckley on the grounds that it involved a 
different situation—there, one group of prosecutors coerced false testimony 
while another used that testimony at trial.225  Furthermore, both argued that 
the Eighth Circuit properly applied the functional test in reaching 
prosecutors’ actions taken outside the advocatory functions (e.g. the 
procurement of false testimony and the introduction of said testimony at 
trial).226  McGhee also argued that relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be 
available in cases like this to deter prosecutorial misconduct, or prosecutors 
would fabricate evidence in criminal investigations, knowing there is little 
chance that punishment would result.227 
                                                           
killing of a white Council Bluffs, Iowa police officer.  Indeed, they preferred framing two 
innocent black teenagers to conducting a proper investigation of white suspects . . . .”  
McGhee Opposition Brief, supra note 218,  
at 5–6.   
 220. See Reply to Briefs in Opposition at 11, McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (No. 08-1065) 
(“Petitioners consistently have maintained that even if the alleged facts were true, 
respondents’ claims must fail because petitioners are immune as a matter of law.”). 
 221. 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 222. Id. at 795; see also Reply to Briefs in Opposition, supra note 220, at 2–3 (arguing 
that although Respondents attempted to trivialize the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Buckley 
as “illusory” and “an isolated aberration,” some circuits have since directly applied the 
holding or applied a similar test). 
 223. See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 219, at 7–8, 34–36 (discussing cases that 
apply the function test, under which “a prosecutor is absolutely immune for acts that are 
‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process’” (quoting Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 (1993)). 
 224. Id. at 5. 
 225. McGhee Opposition Brief, supra note 218, at 16–17; Harrington Opposition Brief, 
supra note 218, at 12–14. 
 226. McGhee Opposition Brief, supra note 218, at 9–10; Harrington Opposition Brief, 
supra note 218, at 12–13. 
 227. McGhee Opposition Brief, supra note 218, at 19.  
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The amici curiae brief filed by the National Association of Assistant 
United States Attorneys and the National District Attorneys Association in 
support of the former prosecutors focused on the practical implications of 
allowing the Eighth Circuit’s decision to stand and addressed McGhee’s 
argument about deterrence.228  The amici explained that allowing 
prosecutors to face litigation and potential civil liability will “chill[] 
prosecutorial efforts that are necessary to combat and deter crime.  The 
increase in litigation will impose precisely the burdens on prosecutors—in 
terms of both time and money—that the doctrine of absolute immunity is 
intended to preclude.”229  Further, the amici highlighted alternative 
punishments and sanctions that are already available, such as federal and 
state attorney disciplinary organizations and review boards,230 judicial 
sanctions, job loss, and criminal sanctions.231  Notably absent from the list 
of available sanctions, however, was a remedy that might, in some way, go 
toward addressing the harm suffered by the wrongfully-convicted.232 
In addition to considering the misconduct of prosecutors, the Supreme 
Court also considered the bad lawyering of criminal defense attorneys 
during the 2009 term, granting review to a record ten ineffective assistance 
of counsel cases involving lawyering issues.233  In several of the cases, the 
Court analyzed the constitutional sufficiency of evidence offered during the 
sentencing or mitigation phase of a capital murder trial, and in the other 
cases the Court evaluated the consequences of a misguided closing 
argument, misadvice, a missed deadline, and the lack of a limiting 
instruction. 
                                                           
 228. See generally Brief of the National Association of Assistant United States Attorneys 
and National District Attorneys Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010) (No. 08-1065). 
 229. Id. at 2. 
 230. See id. at 8–12 (discussing entities such as the Department of Justice’s Office of 
Professional Responsibility, which investigates episodes of prosecutorial misconduct by 
Department attorneys including “allegations of improper coercion or intimidation of 
witnesses,” and state bar associations that have authority to discipline both federal and state 
prosecutors within their jurisdictions for such infractions). 
 231. See id. at 13–15 (explaining additional checks on prosecutorial misconduct already 
in place such as the “adversarial system” that ensures a prosecutor’s actions are challenged 
at trial, and “reversal on appeal” because of the negative impact such a ruling can have on a 
prosecutor’s career). 
 232. Perhaps the multi-million dollar settlement that McGhee and Harrington received in 
this case will do so, though the effectiveness of such a settlement as a deterrent against 
similar future misconduct by prosecutors is unclear.  See Rosenthal, supra note 207, at 152–
53 (arguing that damages liability is unlikely to deter prosecutorial misconduct because 
most damages awards will be passed on to the public through indemnification). 
 233. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.  In the past decade, three merits 
opinions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases involving lawyering issues are the most 
that have occurred in any term.  See Appendix. 
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2. Inexperience and insufficient mitigation evidence:  Wood v. Allen 
Wood v. Allen,234 one of ten decisions addressing the criminal 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, 
presented an issue certain to resonate with law students and newly 
practicing lawyers, as well as with the more senior attorneys  
who train and supervise them:  the degree to which an attorney’s 
inexperience235 plays a role in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
More specifically, the question presented to the Court was whether “the 
failure of a novice attorney with no criminal law experience to pursue or 
present evidence of [the] defendant’s severely impaired mental functioning 
was a strategic decision,” despite evidence in the record demonstrating 
otherwise.236 
Affirming the Eleventh Circuit, a divided Supreme Court held that the 
exclusion of this evidence from the mitigation phase of the capital murder 
trial was, indeed, a strategic decision.237  Consequently, the Court 
concluded that the habeas relief sought was not warranted.238  Notably, the 
Court paid little attention to the inexperience of Wood’s lawyer, despite the 
fact that the lawyer’s inexperience was emphasized heavily by Wood on 
appeal and by Judge Barkett, writing in dissent to the Eleventh Circuit 
opinion.239 
The case originated from a challenge to the death sentence for capital 
murder given to the petitioner, Holly Wood, a black man with an IQ below 
70, who was represented during the penalty phase by Kenneth Trotter, a 
                                                           
 234. 542 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010). 
 235. Both newly practicing lawyers and their supervising attorneys have professional 
obligations regarding attorney inexperience.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.1 cmt. 1 (2009) (“In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge 
and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and 
specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the lawyer’s training and 
experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the 
matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer 
of established competence in the field in question.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
5.1 (2009) (addressing “[r]esponsibilities of [p]artners, [m]anagers, and [s]upervisory 
[l]awyers”). 
 236. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Wood, 130 S. Ct. 841 (No. 08-9156). 
 237. Wood, 130 S. Ct. 841, 851 (2010).  But see id. at 851–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(distinguishing the decision to enter evidence of Wood’s mental deficiency at trial from the 
decision to enter the evidence at sentencing, and arguing that while not entering the 
evidence at trial was a strategic decision, not entering that evidence at sentencing was “the 
result of inattention and neglect”). 
 238. Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 845. 
 239. See id. at 850 (declining to address the question of “whether counsel’s judgment 
was reasonable” and instead focusing on “whether counsel made a strategic decision”).  But 
see Wood, 542 F.3d at 1292–94 (describing the preparation for the penalty phase conducted 
by Trotter, the most inexperienced attorney of the three that represented Wood in his 
criminal trial); id. at 1320 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“Due to Trotter’s inexperience, and to 
[the other attorneys’] lack of participation in preparation for the penalty phase, no 
investigation of Wood’s mental retardation was conducted at all, and that alone is the reason 
it was never presented to the jury in mitigation.”). 
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novice lawyer without any experience in criminal law.240  Though Wood 
had been assigned two additional trial counsel with more experience, those 
attorneys delegated the sentencing process to Trotter, and “[i]n effect, 
Trotter was left to sink or swim.”241  In his petition brief, Wood argued that 
Trotter’s efforts were “woefully inadequate” and that “[d]espite [] clear 
evidence of mental impairments, neither Trotter nor either of his co-counsel 
pursued that evidence as a mitigating factor.”242  Wood claimed his lawyers 
were ineffective in the sentencing phase for two reasons:  first, they “did 
not present to the jury evidence of Wood’s borderline intellectual 
functioning and special education classes,” and second, they “failed to 
adequately investigate those issues before deciding against presenting 
mental health evidence.”243 
The Eleventh Circuit considered a range of evidence to evaluate the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, including testimony from each 
attorney, the mitigating evidence presented to the jury and sentencing 
judge, and the additional evidence that Wood argued should have been 
investigated and presented.244  Applying the Strickland v. Washington245 
test for ineffective assistance of counsel, which requires a deficient 
performance by counsel and that the deficiency prejudiced the defendant, a 
divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit rejected Wood’s argument.246 
In reaching its conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit observed that this was 
“not a case where counsel failed to present any mitigation evidence,”247 nor 
was “this a case where counsel failed to obtain any mental evaluation or did 
not know about the mental condition in issue.”248  Rather, the challenge 
rested on “whether not telling the jury about Wood’s low intellectual 
functioning—shown clearly in [a mental health expert’s] pre-trial report—
was ineffective assistance.”249  Given the “highly deferential review of 
counsel’s performance”250 required by Strickland and other precedent, the 
                                                           
 240. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 236, at 3 (citation omitted). 
 241. Id.; see ALA. CODE § 13A-5-54 (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring that attorneys 
appointed to capital murder cases have a minimum of five years experience in criminal law).  
But see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2009) (“A lawyer need not 
necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with 
which the lawyer is unfamiliar.  A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a 
practitioner with long experience.”).  
 242. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 236, at 4. 
 243. Wood, 542 F.3d at 1289. 
 244. Id. at 1289–99. 
 245. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  In Strickland, the Supreme Court established that to find 
ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must prove that:  
(1) the quality of the counsel’s representation failed to meet an “objective standard of 
reasonableness” and (2) this caused the defendant prejudice.  Id. at 687–88, 691–92. 
 246. See Wood, 542 F.3d at 1303. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
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Eleventh Circuit sided with the other state courts reviewing the matter (but 
not the federal district court)251 and concluded that this decision did not 
constitute deficient performance.252  As to Wood’s argument that his 
counsel did not conduct a thorough investigation, the court again applied 
Strickland to find that the duty “‘to make reasonable investigations’”253 was 
satisfied.254  Untroubled by Trotter’s lack of experience, the majority 
instead focused on the fact that two other experienced attorneys also had 
been involved in the case.255 
Writing in dissent, however, Judge Barkett was incredibly disturbed by 
what she described as “egregious failures of Wood’s defense counsel to 
investigate and develop available mitigating evidence for the penalty 
phase,” the very kinds of failures that ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims are designed to prevent.256  Devoting over twenty pages exclusively 
to the issue of whether Trotter’s inexperience caused ineffective counsel, 
she observed that “[n]o evidence of Wood’s mental retardation was ever 
presented to the jury” and dismissed the majority’s finding that this was a 
strategic decision as “nothing but pure speculation” that “ignore[d] specific 
and direct evidence of ineffectiveness of counsel.”257  Instead, Judge 
Barkett argued that the majority finding “resemble[d] more a post hoc 
rationalization of counsels’ conduct than an accurate description of their 
deliberations prior to sentencing.”258 
Examining Trotter’s experience, Judge Barkett noted several concerns.  
Trotter had been practicing law for less than six months and conveyed his 
nervousness about handling the case, yet was given primary responsibility 
for the penalty phase of the trial.259  This and other evidence led Judge 
Barkett to find that Trotter’s inexperience and lack of assistance from the 
                                                           
 251. See Wood v. Allen, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1242, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (holding 
that the evidence did not support the state court’s finding that Trotter made a “strategic 
decision” not to present evidence of Wood’s mental retardation and, accordingly, vacating 
Wood’s death sentence), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,  
542 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010).  
 252. See Wood, 542 F.3d at 1303–04 (holding that counsels’ determination that “calling 
[the mental health expert] would not be in Wood’s best interest” was not objectively 
unreasonable based on the facts). 
 253. Id. at 1307 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)). 
 254. See id. at 1308 n.28 (distinguishing from Wiggins because counsel in that case 
failed to investigate defendant’s mental condition altogether, while in Wood counsel did 
investigate before deciding not to enter evidence of the defendant’s mental condition). 
 255. Id. at 1292. 
 256. Id. at 1315 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 257. Id. at 1314. 
 258. Id. at 1321 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526–27). 
 259. Id. at 1316; see id. at 1316–18 (“Trotter expressed his frustration at the lack of 
supervision and guidance he was receiving in a letter to . . . the Southern Poverty Law 
Center, stating, ‘I have been stressed out over this case and don’t have anyone with whom to 
discuss the case, including the two other attorneys.’”) (emphasis omitted). 
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other two attorneys in preparing for Wood’s penalty phase caused Wood to 
be prejudiced due to ineffective assistance of counsel.260 
Wood relied heavily on arguments similar to Judge Barkett’s dissent in 
his petition to the Supreme Court.261  In opposing the petition, Alabama’s 
attorney general primarily looked to the rulings of the Eleventh Circuit and 
the two state courts rejecting Wood’s claim that his counsel were 
ineffective.262  Regarding the first prong of Strickland, which requires a 
showing of deficient performance, the attorney general cited the 
conclusions of one of the state court’s previous rulings on the case:  
Wood’s counsel made a reasonable judgment that another mental 
evaluation was not necessary.  Because every counsel is faced with a 
zero-sum calculation on time, resources, and defenses to pursue at 
trial . . . counsel does not enjoy the benefit of unlimited time and 
resources [to investigate every possible argument].
263
 
As for the prejudice prong, the attorney general maintained that given “the 
brutal nature of his crime and the specific findings of the court that 
sentenced him to death,” Wood’s counsel’s decision not to enter evidence 
of his mental retardation at the sentencing phase did not prejudice him 
because it “would not have altered, diminished, or undermined the [] 
aggravating circumstances.”264 
A divided Supreme Court sided with the Eleventh Circuit.265  Justice 
Sotomayor, writing for the 7-2 majority, explained: 
Reviewing all of the evidence, we agree with the State that even if it is 
debatable, it is not unreasonable to conclude that . . . counsel made a 
strategic decision not to inquire further into the information contained in 
the report about Wood’s mental deficiencies and not to present to the 
jury such information as counsel already possessed about these 
deficiencies.
266
 
Justices Stevens and Kennedy disagreed.  Justice Stevens, writing in 
dissent, said that the only conclusion he could draw from the record is that 
the decision not to introduce evidence of Wood’s mental impairment was 
                                                           
 260. Id. at 1320, 1322. 
 261. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 236, at 19–23 (“The record reflects 
that Counsel’s failure to request an independent psychological evaluation at that late date 
was not based on a weighing of the pros and cons for Wood, but solely based on their 
conclusion ‘that . . . they didn’t think the Judge would grant a continuance.’”) (citation 
omitted).  
 262. Brief of Respondents in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, 
Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010) (No. 08-9156). 
 263. Id. at 19–20 (quotation and punctuation marks omitted). 
 264. Id. at 29.  As described in the brief:  “Wood brutally murdered Ruby Gosha while 
she was asleep in her bed in her mother’s house and then callously bragged about the crime 
to his cousin . . . .”  Id. 
 265. Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 851. 
 266. Id. at 850–51. 
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due to neglect and lack of attention and that such a decision runs counter to 
“[t]he lawyers’ duty to conduct a thorough investigation of possible 
mitigating evidence [that] is well established by our cases.”267  
Furthermore, Justice Stevens declared that “[d]espite the fact that Trotter 
had a meager five months of experience as a lawyer when he was appointed 
to represent Wood, . . . even he knew that further investigation into any 
mental or psychological deficits was in order.”268  This case was not the 
Court’s final word on adequate mitigation evidence, however, during the 
2009 term. 
3. More on insufficient mitigation evidence:  Wong v. Belmontes,  Bobby 
v. Van Hook, Porter v. McCollum,  Jefferson v. Upton,  and Sears v. Upton 
Wood was not the only opportunity for the Supreme Court to consider 
the sufficiency of evidence offered during the sentencing phase of a capital 
murder trial.  The Court granted certiorari and issued per curiam opinions 
without argument in five additional cases that examined a criminal defense 
attorney’s obligation to secure mitigation evidence during sentencing.269  
The Court reversed or vacated the lower court decisions in all five cases.  
In Bobby v. Van Hook270 and Wong v. Belmontes,271 the Court reversed the 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ decisions that counsel’s performance was 
deficient and prejudicial in failing to offer sufficient evidence.272  However, 
in Porter v. McCollum,273 the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision that counsel’s failure to offer additional mitigating evidence was 
not prejudicial.274  Similarly, in Jefferson v. Upton275 and Sears v. Upton,276 
the Court vacated the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme 
Court of Georgia, respectively, finding that both lower courts failed to 
properly evaluate the sufficiency of mitigation evidence.  Read together, 
the opinions offer guidance for determining when the Court believes a 
                                                           
 267. Id. at 852–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 268. Id. at 854. 
 269. Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009) (per curiam); Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. 
Ct. 383 (2009) (per curiam); Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009)  
(per curiam); Jefferson v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 2217 (2010) (per curiam); Sears v. Upton, 130 
S. Ct. 3259 (2010) (per curiam). 
 270. 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009) (per curiam). 
 271. 130 S. Ct. 383 (2009) (per curiam). 
 272. See Bobby, 130 S. Ct. at 15–16 (describing the Sixth Circuit’s disposition of the 
case and rejecting the circuit court’s theory of the case); Wong, 130 S. Ct. at 384 (rejecting 
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of prejudice). 
 273. 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009) (per curiam). 
 274. Id. at 455–56. 
 275. 130 S. Ct. 2217(2010) (per curiam) (Scalia, J. dissenting, joined by  
Thomas, J.). 
 276. 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3261 (2010) (per curiam) (Scalia, J. dissenting, joined by Thomas, 
J.) (The Chief Justice and Justice Alito would deny the petition for certiorari.). 
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lawyer’s failure to put on additional mitigating evidence amounts to a 
constitutional violation. 
The cases bear a number of striking similarities, and understanding these 
similarities is critical to appreciating the significance of their differences.  
All five cases involved particularly gruesome murders that occurred in the 
early and mid-1980s (with the exception of one that took place in the early-
1990s).277  All five defendants experienced horrific physical and 
psychological abuse278 or physical trauma279 during childhood, evidence of 
which they sought to use during the penalty phase of their murder trials but 
were prevented from doing so.  And, as mentioned above, the lower court 
decisions in all five cases were reversed or vacated by the Supreme Court. 
Of the three reversals, what separates Porter (where the Court said the 
mitigating evidence was not sufficient) from Van Hook and Belmontes 
(where the Court said the mitigating evidence was sufficient) is the fact that 
Porter’s attorney omitted entire categories of evidence—most notably his 
honorable military service.280  The only mitigating evidence Porter’s 
attorney offered was “inconsistent testimony about Porter’s behavior when 
intoxicated and testimony that Porter had a good relationship with his 
son.”281  No evidence was offered about Porter’s childhood abuse, mental 
                                                           
 277. See Bobby, 130 S. Ct. at 15 (detailing how Van Hook lured the victim into a 
vulnerable position where he strangled and subsequently murdered him with a kitchen knife 
before mutilating the body); Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 448 (recounting how Porter threatened and 
repeatedly drove past the house of a former girlfriend before subsequently shooting and 
killing her); Wong, 130 S. Ct. at 384 (describing how Belmontes used a steel bar to fatally 
bludgeon his victim during the course of a burglary); Jefferson v. Hall, 570 F.3d 1283, 1287 
(11th Cir. 2009) (reviewing the severe beating of the victim with wooden sticks or clubs, and 
a log dropped on the victim’s head); Sears v. State, 514 S.E.2d 426, 430 (Ga. 1999) 
(explaining that victim was kidnapped while leaving a supermarket, assaulted with brass 
knuckles, raped, and killed by knife stabbing). 
 278. See Bobby, 130 S. Ct. at 18 (“Van Hook (whose parents were both ‘heavy drinkers’) 
started drinking as a toddler, began ‘barhopping’ with his father at age 9, drank and used 
drugs regularly with his father from age 11 forward[,] . . . watched his father beat his mother 
weekly, . . . and was beaten himself at least once.”); Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 449 (“Porter 
routinely witnessed his father beat his mother, one time so severely that she had to go to the 
hospital and lost a child.  Porter’s father was violent every weekend, and by his siblings’ 
account, Porter was his father’s favorite target.”); Wong, 130 S. Ct. at 387 (“A number of [] 
witnesses highlighted Belmontes’ ‘terrible’ childhood.  They testified that his father was an 
alcoholic and extremely abusive.”); Sears, 130S. Ct. at 3262 (“His parents had a physically 
abusive relationship . . . he suffered sexual abuse at the hands of an adolescent male cousin” 
and his parents were “verbally abusive . . . and disciplined Sears with age-inappropriate 
military-style drills.”).  
 279. See Jefferson, 130 S. Ct. at 2218 (“When Jefferson was a child, he suffered a 
serious injury to his head. … [His mother testified] that a car ran over the top of his head 
when he was two years old” and left him with “permanent brain damage that causes 
abnormal behavior over which he has no or substantially limited control.”) (internal 
punctuation and citations omitted).  
 280. See Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 449–50 (describing Porter’s “heroic military service” and 
the subsequent mental trauma it caused him). 
 281. Id. at 449 (highlighting counsel’s failure to present any evidence related to Porter’s 
mental health). 
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health, or, significantly, his military history.282  The Court was especially 
impressed by the honorable and heroic nature of Porter’s military 
service.283  So impressed, in fact, that the court considered Porter’s 
lawyer’s omission of a “commanding officer’s moving description [of] his 
active participation in two major engagements during the Korean War” 
amounted to a constitutional deprivation.284  Also relevant to the Court was 
evidence of the trauma Porter sustained from his military service, including 
“long-term substance abuse, and his impaired mental health and mental 
capacity.”285 
In contrast, the attorneys for Van Hook and Belmontes both presented 
some evidence regarding their clients’ childhood abuse and psychological 
trauma, but Van Hook and Belmontes each argued that their attorneys 
should have presented further testimony from additional witnesses.286  
While the appellate courts were sympathetic, the Supreme Court was not, 
finding that additional testimony would be unlikely to alter the ultimate 
result.287  Thus these cases reveal that a constitutional concern may be 
raised when an entire category of mitigation evidence goes unconsidered 
(i.e. Porter’s military history), but not when more evidence falling into the 
same category is omitted (i.e. Van Hook’s and Belmonte’s additional 
evidence on childhood abuse).  The two vacated cases confirm this 
conclusion. 
As for the two vacated cases, the Supreme Court determined that the 
lower courts failed to properly apply the standards for finding prejudice 
under Strickland v. Washington based upon insufficient mitigation evidence 
(Sears) or to properly apply the standards for holding an evidentiary 
hearing challenging the sufficiency of mitigation evidence (Jefferson).  In 
Sears, the Court held that the state “court failed to apply the proper 
prejudice inquiry,” observing that “[w]e have never limited the prejudice 
inquiry under Strickland to cases in which there was only little or no 
                                                           
 282. Id. 
 283. See id. at 454 (describing Porter’s military service as “heroic,” and sympathetically 
depicting his struggle to “regain normality” upon leaving military service). 
 284. Id. at 448. 
 285. Id. at 449. 
 286. Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 18–19 (2009) (per curiam); Wong v. Belmontes, 
130 S. Ct. 383, 384, 387 (2009) (per curiam). 
 287. Bobby, 130 S. Ct. at 19–20 (“But there comes a point at which evidence from more 
distant relatives can reasonably be expected to be only cumulative, and the search for it 
distractive from more important duties. . . . Neither the Court of Appeals nor Van Hook has 
shown why the minor additional details the trial court did not hear would have made any 
difference.”); Wong, 130 S. Ct. at 391 (“It is hard to imagine expert testimony and 
additional facts about Belmontes’ difficult childhood outweighing the facts of [the] murder. 
. . . [T]he notion that the result could have been different if only [his attorney] had put on 
more than the nine witnesses he did, or called expert witnesses to bolster his case, is 
fanciful.”) (emphasis in original). 
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mitigation evidence presented.”288  Moreover, the Court clarified that “[w]e 
certainly have never held that counsel’s effort to present some mitigation 
evidence should foreclose an inquiry into whether a facially deficient 
mitigation investigation might have prejudiced the defendant.”289  Thus the 
fact that some mitigation evidence was introduced (“evidence describing 
[Sears’] childhood as stable, loving, and essentially without incident . . . [to 
show that] a death sentence . . . would devastate the family”)290 does not 
foreclose a conclusion that the defendant was prejudiced by a failure to 
introduce additional evidence of a different nature (evidence showing an 
abusive childhood including “significant frontal lobe abnormalities . . . 
[and] several serious head injuries he suffered as a child as well as drug and 
alcohol abuse”).291  In Jefferson, the Court found that the Eleventh Circuit 
erred in considering only one of the eight exceptions applicable for 
determining “whether the state court’s factual findings [that investigation 
of Jefferson’s childhood head trauma was unnecessary for mitigation 
purposes] warrant a presumption of correctness.”292  As in Sears, the Court 
vacated the decision below and remanded the case back to the lower court 
for further consideration.293 
4. Disloyalty in the closing argument:  Smith v. Spisak 
Smith v. Spisak
294 introduced yet another claim of constitutionally 
ineffective lawyering, this time based, in part, upon a lawyer’s trial strategy 
at closing argument.295  Defendant Spisak was convicted in 1983 of four 
murders at Cleveland State University.296  He pled not guilty by reason of 
insanity, but admitted to the murders.297  During the trial he showed no 
remorse and claimed to be a follower of Adolf Hitler.298  Though a number 
of experts were prepared to testify about Spisak’s mental illness, they were 
excluded from supporting his insanity claim.299 
                                                           
 288. Sears, 130 S.Ct. 3259, 3266 (2010) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). 
 289. Id. at 3266 (emphasis in original). 
 290. Id. at 3261. 
 291. Id. at 3262.   
 292. 130 S. Ct. at 2223. 
 293. Id. at 2221 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) which codifies the factors to be considered 
for presumption of correctness to be applied to the state court factual determinations in a 
federal habeas appeal). 
 294. 130 S. Ct. 676 (2010). 
 295. Id. at 680. 
 296. Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F.3d 684, 688–90 (6th Cir. 2006), remanded, Hudson v. 
Spisak, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007), rev’d, Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676, 680 (2010). 
 297. Id. at 688, 690. 
 298. See id. at 688 (detailing the court’s competency proceedings and Spisak’s request 
for multiple psychiatric evaluations). 
 299. See e.g., id. at 691–703 (recounting Dr. Oscar Markey’s diagnosis of Spisak’s 
mental state and subsequently approving of the lower court’s exclusion of that testimony 
because it failed to show that Spisak met the legal standard required for a plea of not guilty 
by reason of insanity). 
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In the closing argument of the sentencing phase, Spisak’s attorney 
“repeatedly stress[ed] the brutality of the crimes and demean[ed] 
[Spisak].”300  He described each murder in graphic detail, made little 
mention of Spisak’s mental illness as a mitigating factor, and “rambl[ed] 
incoherently . . . about integrity in the legal system.”301  The district court 
found the argument to be “an appropriate part of trial counsel’s strategy to 
confront the heinousness of the murders before the prosecution had the 
opportunity to do so.”302 
The Sixth Circuit disagreed.  The court reasoned that “in pursuing this 
course, [Spisak’s attorney] abandoned the duty of loyalty owed to [his 
client].”303  Of particular concern to the court was the  
attorney’s failure to explain mental illness as a mitigating factor  
and that the attorney’s “hostility toward [Spisak] aligned [him]  
with the prosecution against his own client.”304  Furthermore, the court 
observed, “[m]uch of [Spisak’s attorney’s] argument during the closing of 
mitigation could have been made by the prosecution, and if it had, would 
likely have been grounds for a successful prosecutorial misconduct 
claim.”305  The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of 
habeas.306 
Ohio’s attorney general argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that 
Spisak’s attorney’s closing argument was “reasonable when viewed from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”307  A group of prominent trial advocacy 
law professors, who filed an amicus curiae brief, took issue with this 
position.308  They explained that Spisak’s attorney’s closing argument 
unconstitutionally prejudiced his case, asserting that “a closing argument 
that magnifies and obsesses on weaknesses, while discussing strengths in 
an indirect and at  
times incomprehensible manner, is below any reasonable measure  
of professional competence.”309  “For this Court to determine otherwise,” 
they warned, “would teach generations of future lawyers incorrect lessons 
about how to present a case, and would leave clients . . . without the 
                                                           
 300. Id. at 704. 
 301. Id. at 705. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at 706. 
 304. Id. (comparing Spisak’s representation to the representation in Rickman v. Bell, 131 
F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1997), where defense counsel repeatedly disparaged his client as part of 
a strategy to persuade the jury that the defendant’s “sick” nature warranted mitigation of his 
capital sentence). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 687–88, 703. 
 307. Brief of Petitioner at 36, Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676 (2010) (No. 08-724). 
 308. Brief of Stephen Lubet et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Spisak, 
130 S. Ct. 676 (No. 08-724). 
 309. Id. at 3. 
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reasonable assurance of actual assistance of counsel to which the Sixth 
Amendment entitles them.”310 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer conceded that Spisak’s 
attorney delivered an ineffective closing argument but “nevertheless 
[found] no ‘reasonable probability’ that a better closing argument without 
these defects would have made a significant difference.”311  Because Spisak 
admitted to the murders and shootings and, among other things, testified 
that he was a follower of Adolf Hitler and that he “had hoped to ‘create 
terror’” targeting his victims based on their race, the Court determined that 
an improved closing argument would not have altered the result.312  Justice 
Stevens, however, wrote separately in a concurring opinion to emphasize 
the deplorable nature of the closing argument: 
 It is difficult to convey how thoroughly egregious counsel’s closing 
argument was without reproducing it in its entirety . . . . Suffice it to say 
that the argument shares far more in common with a prosecutor’s closing 
than with a criminal defense attorney’s.  Indeed, the argument was so 
outrageous that it would have rightly subjected a prosecutor to charges of 
misconduct. . . . 
 . . . . 
 Spisak’s crimes, and the seemingly unmitigated hatred motivating 
their commission, were truly awful.  But that does not excuse a lawyer’s 
duty to represent his client within the bounds of prevailing professional 
norms. . . . In short, counsel’s argument grossly transgressed the bounds 
of what constitutionally competent counsel would have done in a similar 
situation.
313
 
The Court’s decision in Spisak brings to light a disconcerting breach in 
the system of lawyer regulation that is supposed to protect clients from 
such “thoroughly egregious” behavior by lawyers.  While the outcome 
might not have been different for Spisak, his attorney nonetheless remained 
bound to the requirements of professional conduct.  Yet it appears no 
discipline or other follow up occurred before the Ohio Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel or Grievance Committee.314 
                                                           
 310. Id. 
 311. Smith, 130 S. Ct. at 685. 
 312. Id. at 686–87. 
 313. Id. at 691–93. 
 314.   See Renee Newman Knake, Study of Disciplinary Action in U.S. Supreme Court 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Prosecutorial Misconduct Cases (unpublished study, 
on file with author).  For another theory on the strategy employed by Spisak’s attorney, see 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Bad  
Lawyer Blog, http://badlawyernyc.blogspot.com/2009/10/ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel.html#comments (Oct. 14, 2009) (suggesting that Spisak’s attorney, Tom 
Shaughnessy, wanted to “save Frank Spisak’s life—and, that Shaughnessy ‘ineffectively’ 
knew precisely what he was doing” in making such a prejudicial closing argument).  
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5. Misadvice:  Padilla v. Kentucky 
In Padilla v. Kentucky315 a legal permanent resident brought an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim after his attorney incorrectly advised 
him that pleading guilty to three drug-related charges would not result in 
deportation.316  The case raised two closely related questions regarding the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel:  first, 
whether an attorney has an affirmative duty to advise a non-citizen client 
that pleading guilty to an offense will result in deportation (or is this a 
“collateral consequence” that would relieve the attorney of such a duty?); 
and second, if the deportation is in fact a collateral consequence, does an 
attorney’s misadvice that a guilty plea will not result in deportation 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?317   
A brief history of this case clarifies the questions presented.  The 
petitioner, Jose Padilla, had lived in the United States for over forty years 
(and served in the U.S. military during the Vietnam War) when he was 
indicted in 2001 on three drug counts related to the trafficking and 
possession of marijuana and for failing to have an appropriate tax number 
on the truck he was driving.318  Padilla conferred with his attorney about 
how to respond to the charges, asking specifically about the consequences 
of a guilty plea.319  After his attorney reassured him “that he ‘did not have 
to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so 
long,’”320 Padilla pled guilty to the drug charges and the other charge was 
dropped.321 
But the advice from Padilla’s attorney was wrong.  Two federal statutes 
related to antiterrorism and illegal immigration reform enacted in 1996 
made Padilla’s felony an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and 
Nationalization Act, with deportation mandatory following a guilty plea to 
such a charge.322  Accordingly, Padilla sought post-conviction relief 
arguing that his attorney’s wrong advice about the deportation 
                                                           
 315. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2008), rev’d and remanded Padilla 
v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 316. Id. at 1478. 
 317. Brief of Petitioner at i, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651) [hereinafter Padilla 
Petitioner Brief]. 
 318. 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
 319. See id. (indicating that Padilla’s counsel had discussed the possibility of deportation 
with Padilla, and that Padilla’s counsel had given him a direct answer). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. See Padilla Petitioner Brief, supra note 317, at 5–7 (citing AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 
104-132 § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276–77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 
U.S.C. § 1229(b) (1996)). 
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consequences of a guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel.323 
A divided Kentucky Supreme Court rejected Padilla’s request for relief 
based upon his attorney’s misadvice, holding that mandatory deportation is 
a “collateral consequence[] . . . outside the scope of the guarantee of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”324  The court grounded its decision in 
the precedent of Commonwealth v. Fuartado,325 where it previously held 
that attorneys have no duty to advise their client about the possible 
deportation consequences of a guilty plea.326 
The two dissenting justices, however, argued that Fuartado was 
“distinguishable in a small, but critical way.”327  Specifically, they noted 
that although an attorney may not have an “affirmative duty to inform his 
or her client of the impact that a guilty plea will have on civil immigration 
status,” Padilla’s situation was different in that  
he explicitly asked his counsel about that very issue and was given “terribly 
wrong advice.”328  The dissent went on to explain that “[c]ounsel who gives 
erroneous advice to a client which influences a felony conviction is worse 
than no lawyer at all.  Common sense dictates that such deficient lawyering 
goes to effectiveness.”329  The dissent concluded that, at a minimum, 
Padilla “was at least entitled to a hearing” on the matter.330 
Other courts considering similar types of cases involving attorney advice 
on collateral consequences of a guilty plea apply a variety of approaches in 
determining what amounts to ineffective assistance.331  Padilla’s petition to 
the Supreme Court classified the approaches into four categories:  (1) 
finding ineffective assistance only if an attorney volunteers wrong advice; 
(2) allowing an attorney to refuse to answer a question but finding 
ineffective assistance if wrong advice is given; (3) affirmatively requiring 
attorneys to advise clients of immigration consequences of guilty pleas 
(like deportation); and (4) the approach of Kentucky courts finding that 
misadvice on collateral consequences is never grounds for setting aside a 
plea.332  Padilla argued that Kentucky’s approach was out of step with 
precedent of the Supreme Court and the majority of lower courts that have 
                                                           
 323. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
 324. Id. at 485. 
 325. 170 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005), abrogated by Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 
(2010). 
 326. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483 (citing Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384). 
 327. Id. at 485 (Cunningham, J., dissenting). 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See generally Padilla Petitioner Brief, supra note 317 at 54–58 (discussing 
considerations and approaches taken by various state and federal courts). 
 332. See id. at 27, 54–58. 
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addressed this issue,333 as well as with the standards of the American Bar 
Association and public defenders’ organizations that require counsel to 
investigate and advise clients about collateral consequences of 
conviction.334  Specifically, he looked to Strickland v. Washington335 where 
the Supreme Court established the test for finding ineffective assistance of 
counsel, contending that he could not be bound to a plea that was 
substantially induced by his attorney’s mistaken advice regarding the 
deportation consequences of pleading guilty.336 
In opposing the petition, the Commonwealth of Kentucky essentially 
focused on Fuartado’s treatment of collateral consequences.337  The key 
components of the argument were that the Sixth Amendment does not 
guarantee a criminal defendant any right to receive advice from counsel 
regarding the collateral consequences of a guilty plea and, accordingly, it 
necessarily follows that since deportation is a collateral consequence, the 
failure to advise is indistinguishable from misadvice.338  While indicating 
that an attorney’s ethical obligations might be implicated by the misadvice, 
the Commonwealth asserted that Sixth Amendment protections do not 
extend to issues “wholly collateral to the criminal prosecution.”339 
The Supreme Court reversed,340 and instead provided for “an 
extraordinary expansion of the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal 
defendants.”341  In a 7-2 decision, the Court found that the failure to warn 
Padilla about his deportation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, observed that “[d]eportation as a 
                                                           
 333. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10–15, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 
(2010) (No. 08-651) (noting a 27–3 split among the courts on the question of whether 
counsel have no Sixth Amendment duty to advise immigration defendants of the deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea and a 17–2 split on the question of whether, considering 
deportation as a collateral consequence, misadvice nonetheless violates the Sixth 
Amendment, with only Kentucky and the D.C. Circuit holding that it does not). 
 334. See Padilla Petitioner Brief, supra note 317, at 15–16 (asserting that basic 
representation and advice of counsel must consider any dire risks or consequences that 
result from legal action).  
 335. For a discussion of Strickland’s two-prong ineffective assistance of counsel test, see 
supra note 245, and accompanying text. 
 336. See Padilla Petitioner Brief, supra note 317, at 14–17 (arguing that the immigration 
consequences of conviction can sometimes be a greater risk for a defendant than criminal 
conviction itself, and asserting that defendants, not attorneys, should define the objectives 
and scope of representation). 
 337. See generally Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 5–6, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 
(No. 08-651) (minimizing the connection between a criminal guilty plea and potential 
deportation, and, further arguing that the central justification for the Sixth Amendment right 
to adequate counsel is to ensure fairness in the establishment of guilt or innocence). 
 338. See id. at 6–7, 16. 
 339. Id. at 17. 
 340. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (alluding to recent changes in immigration law as 
justification for finding that immigration consequences are integral to criminal proceedings). 
 341. Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Colgate Love, Padilla v. Kentucky:  The Right to 
Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction 1, (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion 
Paper No. 10-16, 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1591264. 
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consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to 
the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or 
collateral consequence.”342  As such, the Court applied Strickland and held 
that a lawyer is constitutionally required to advise a client about the 
deportation consequences of a guilty plea.343  The Court declined to decide 
the prejudice prong of Strickland, however, because the question was not 
properly before the Court.344 
Applying the first prong of Strickland—“whether counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”—Justice 
Stevens explained that this inquiry “is necessarily linked to the practice and 
expectations of the legal community” or “prevailing professional norms.”345  
In this case, the majority determined that the “weight of prevailing 
professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client 
regarding the risk of deportation.”346  Thus, as in some of the mitigation 
evidence cases, Padilla’s outcome stands in contrast to the other bad 
lawyering cases because it was resolved favorably for the defendant.  
Another ineffective assistance of counsel case to do so was Holland v. 
Florida. 
6. Missing a critical filing deadline:  Holland v. Florida 
Holland v. Florida
347 involved a death row petitioner’s late-filed federal 
habeas appeal.348  Defendant Holland repeatedly contacted his court-
appointed attorney about the filing of his habeas petition, both by letter and 
telephone.349  But his attorney missed the filing date.350 
Holland then proceeded pro se, filing the petition on his own and 
requesting “equitable tolling,” or an extension, of the deadline based upon 
his attorney’s “gross negligence.”351  The statute of limitations to file a 
federal habeas corpus petition provides for equitable tolling when two 
standards are met:  first, the petitioner must show “that he has been 
                                                           
 342. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
 343. See id. (relying on professional norms to require advice on immigration 
consequences of criminal proceedings). 
 344. Id. at 1487. 
 345. Id. at 1482 (citation omitted). 
 346. Id.  
 347. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev’d and 
remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010). 
 348. Id. at 1336. 
 349. See id. at 1337 (detailing Holland’s attempts to contact his attorney and his 
attorney’s failure to even inform Holland that his petition for a writ of habeas corpus had 
been denied). 
 350. Id. at 1336. 
 351. Id.; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Holland v. Florida, No. 09-5327 
(U.S. May 13, 2009) [hereinafter Holland Petition] (seeking certiorari to determine whether 
late filing of a habeas appeal due to gross negligence of counsel warrants equitable tolling). 
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pursuing his rights diligently, and [second,] that some extraordinary 
circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”352 
According to the Eleventh Circuit, “[p]ure professional negligence is not 
enough” to satisfy this test.353  While the court agreed that the attorney’s 
“failure to file a [timely] federal habeas petition [], despite [Holland’s] 
repeated instructions to do so”354 constituted gross negligence, it 
determined that “no allegation of lawyer negligence or of failure to meet a 
lawyer’s standard of care . . . can rise to the level of egregious attorney 
misconduct that would entitle [Holland] to equitable tolling.”355  In other 
words, “even attorney conduct that is grossly negligent can never warrant 
tolling absent bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or 
so forth on the lawyer’s part.”356 
In his Supreme Court appeal, Holland took issue with  
“[t]he Eleventh Circuit’s stubborn refusal to acknowledge that  
‘gross negligence’ is sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.”357  He 
contended that the Eleventh Circuit’s test conflicts with other circuits and 
establishes a “near-impossible standard to meet.”358  In the opposition brief, 
Florida’s attorney general suggested that Holland’s own behavior, 
including not answering “at least eight letters” written by his attorney, 
should be taken into account, and further argued that equitable tolling is not 
warranted in this case because Holland’s attorney’s “miscalculat[ion of] the 
federal habeas deadline . . . was merely ordinary attorney negligence.”359 
A majority of the Supreme Court agreed with Holland that equitable 
tolling applied to the federal habeas deadline, and rejected the Eleventh 
Circuit’s “rigid” standard for finding the “extraordinary circumstances” 
warranting tolling.360  The Court left the question of whether tolling should 
apply in this particular case, however, to the lower court.361  Justice Breyer 
                                                           
 352. Holland, 539 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079,  
1085 (2007)). 
 353. Id. at 1339. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id.  
 357. Holland Petition, supra note 351, at 7. 
 358. Id. at 7–8. 
 359. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 13, Holland v. Florida, No. 09-5327  
(U.S. Sept. 11, 2009). 
 360. Holland v. Florida 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010) (“[W]e hold that [the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 28 U.S.C.] § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling 
in appropriate cases.” Id. at 2560.).  Justice Breyer authored the 7-2 opinion, with Justice 
Scalia authoring a dissent joined by Justice Thomas. 
 361. See id. at 2565 (“Thus, because we conclude that the District Court’s determination 
must be set aside, we leave it to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the facts in this 
record entitle Holland to equitable tolling, or whether further proceedings, including an 
evidentiary hearing, might indicate that respondent should prevail.”). 
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writing for the majority suggested that the facts of this case “may well be 
an extraordinary instance” where tolling is appropriate: 
[Attorney] Collins failed to file Holland’s federal petition on time despite 
Holland’s many letters that repeatedly emphasized the importance of his 
doing so.  Collins apparently did not do the research necessary to find out 
the proper filing date, despite Holland’s letters that went so far as to 
identify the applicable legal rules.  Collins failed to inform Holland in a 
timely manner about the crucial fact that the Florida Supreme Court had 
decided his case, again despite Holland’s many pleas for that information.  
And Collins failed to communicate with his client over a period of years, 
despite various pleas from Holland that Collins respond to his letters.362 
Like many of the lawyering cases before the Court this term, Holland 
implicates important duties owed by a lawyer to the  
client.  For example, the ABA Model Rules demand minimum  
levels of competence, diligence, and communication.363  A lawyer also is 
required under the Model Rules to “abide by a client’s decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation” and must “consult with the 
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”364  While a 
violation of these duties alone does not necessarily rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation, the compounded violation of multiple professional 
conduct duties as in cases like Holland must be taken into account, a point 
acknowledged by the Court’s majority opinion.365 
7. Failure to request a limiting instruction:  Berghuis v. Thompkins 
Berghuis v. Thompkins366 is best-known for holding that a criminal 
suspect waives his right to remain silent if he does not affirmatively invoke 
the right.367  But the case also touched on a lawyering issue—whether the 
                                                           
 362. Id. at 2564. 
 363. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009) (addressing duty of 
competence); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2009) (“A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(3),(4) (2009) (“A lawyer shall . . . keep the client reasonably informed 
about the status of the matter; [and] promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information . . . .”). 
 364. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2009). 
 365. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564-65 (citing Brief of Legal Ethics Professors and 
Practitioners et. al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner); see also Brief of Legal 
Ethics Professors and Practitioners et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 12, 
Holland v. Florida, No. 09-5327 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2009) (discussing the fiduciary duties 
lawyers owe to their clients and how professional standards of conduct underscore the gross 
nature of the attorney’s negligence in Holland).  
 366. Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 590–91 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d and 
remanded, 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010) (Sotomayor, J. dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, J.J.). 
 367. Id. at 2264.  The portion of the Court’s opinion discussing the waiver of Miranda 
rights received extensive media coverage shortly after the decision was rendered.  See, e.g., 
Adam Liptak, Mere Silence Doesn’t Invoke Miranda, Justices Say, N. Y. TIMES, June 1, 
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defense attorney’s failure to request a limiting instruction constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Van Chester Thompkins was convicted 
of murder and related offenses for the drive-by shooting-death of a man 
outside a mall located in suburban Detroit, Michigan, and injuries to 
another victim.368  According to “the prosecution’s theory, . . . Thompkins 
shot the victims from the passenger seat of a van driven by Eric Purifoy. . . 
. The defense strategy was to pin the blame on Purifoy.”369 
During trial, the prosecution established that Purifoy had been previously 
tried and acquitted on murder and assault charges brought under an aiding-
and-abetting theory since he was the driver.370  In his testimony, Purifoy 
explained that “he had been driving the van and that Thompkins was in the 
passenger seat while another man, [named] Myzell Woodward, was in the 
back.”371  Purifoy then went on to testify that “he did not see who fired the 
weapon because the van was stopped and he was bending over near the 
floor when shots were fired.”372 
The prosecution believed Purifoy was lying.  In an exchange of letters 
between Purifoy and Thompkins that occurred after Purifoy’s trial but 
before Thompkins’s started, “one of Purifoy’s letters appeared to give 
Thompkins a trial strategy.  The prosecution suggested that this strategy 
was to say Woodward shot the victims, allowing Purifoy and Thompkins to 
say they dropped to the floor when the shooting started.”373  Thus, during 
closing arguments, the prosecution “suggested that Purifoy lied when he 
testified that he did not see Thompkins shoot the victims.”374 
Thompkins’s attorney did not object to the prosecution’s inference that 
Purifoy lied, nor did he request “an instruction informing the jury that it 
could consider evidence of the outcome of Purifoy’s trial only to assess 
Purifoy’s credibility, not to establish Tompkins’s guilt.”375  Thompkins was 
sentenced to life in prison without parole after the jury found him guilty on 
                                                           
2010 at A15; Jess Bravin, Justices <arrow Miranda Rule, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2010 at A2; 
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court:  Suspects must invoke right to remain silent in 
interrogations, WASH. POST, June 2, 2010 at A5. 
 368. See 130 S.Ct. at 2256–68. 
 369. Id. at 2257. 
 370. See id. at 2257 (“So that the Thompkins jury could assess Purifoy’s credibility and 
knowledge, the prosecution elicited testimony from Purifoy that he had been tried earlier for 
the shooting under an aiding-and-abetting theory.  Purifoy . . . testified that a jury acquitted 
him of the murder and assault charges” but convicted him of lesser charges like carrying a 
concealed weapon.). 
 371. Id. at 2275. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id.  
 374. Id. at 2257.  The prosecutor argued:  “Did Eric Purifoy’s Jury make the right 
decision?  I’m not here to judge that.  You are not bound by what his Jury found.  Take his 
testimony for what it was, [a] twisted attempt to help not just an acquaintance but his tight 
buddy.”  Id. at 2258. 
 375. Id. at 2258. 
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all charges.  Though the federal district court and state courts denied 
Thompkins’s claim that his attorney’s failure to ask for a limiting 
instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Circuit 
granted him relief. 
According to the Sixth Circuit, “the failure to request such a limiting 
instruction is particularly deficient in light of Thompkins’s primary defense 
at trial, which was that Eric Purifoy was the shooter and that [Thompkins] 
was merely present.”376  The court also found that Strickland’s prejudice 
requirement was clearly established, given that “in the absence of a limiting 
instruction, the jury could well have believed that it was entirely proper to 
weigh Purifoy’s acquittal as significant evidence that Thompkins must have 
been the shooter.”377 
The Supreme Court reversed.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
observed: 
It seems doubtful that failure to request the instruction about the earlier 
acquittal or conviction was deficient representation; but on the 
assumption that it was, on this record, Thompkins cannot show 
prejudice.  The record establishes that it was not reasonably likely that 
the instruction would have made any difference in light of all the other 
evidence of guilt.
378
 
Even if the Sixth Circuit was correct that “the state court used an incorrect 
legal standard” the majority held that Thompkins could not satisfy 
Strickland’s prejudice requirement.379 
 As demonstrated by the summary in Part I of this Article, each  
of the 2009 cases raised on its own important law of  
lawyering considerations, especially regarding access to legal advice and 
adequate legal representation.  Equally critical, however, are observations 
drawn from a collective reading of the cases.  Part II offers some 
preliminary thoughts. 
II. SOMETHING MORE:  DERIVING MEANING FROM THE SUPREME 
COURT’S INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE LAW OF LAWYERING 
The lawyering cases addressed by the Supreme Court during the 2009 
term varied widely in substance, but contained common themes about the 
law of lawyering as well as the rights and interests of those who need legal 
representation and advice.  All of the cases raised important questions 
about the role of lawyers and the practice of law.  Accordingly, the cases 
                                                           
 376. Thompkins v. Berghius, 547 F.3d 572, 590–91 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 377. Id. at 591. 
 378. 130 S.Ct. at 2265. 
 379. Id. 
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should be considered in relation to one another in order to understand and 
appreciate their implications for the law of lawyering field. 
While the full impact of these cases may be realized more fully with the 
passage of time, this Article suggests three reasons why the Court’s 
heightened interest in the law of lawyering appears to be more than mere 
coincidence.  First, when read together, the cases reveal a troubling pattern 
of limitations on access to legal advice coupled with an inability to fully 
redress harms caused by bad lawyering.  Second, certain aspects of the 
cases offer helpful lessons for those involved in future efforts to regulate 
the legal profession.  Third, if any question remains as to the importance of 
constitutional considerations in the study and scholarship of lawyer ethics, 
the Court’s newest lawyering precedent puts the matter to rest.  Each 
observation is addressed in turn below. 
A. Accessing Competent Legal Advice; Ameliorating Harmful Legal 
Representation 
The lawyering cases taken up by the Supreme Court during the 2009 
term reveal a troubling pattern of limitations on access to legal advice 
coupled with an inability to fully redress harms caused by bad lawyering.  
One common thread running through every opinion is the need for clients 
to access competent legal advice and  
effective, rather than harmful, representation.  For example, the cases of 
Milavetz, Humanitarian Law Project, and Mohawk Industries presented the 
Court with assorted dimensions of the attorney’s responsibility to 
competently advise a client, whether the attorney faces constraints on 
advice from a federal statute or finds that attorney-client privilege may not 
be adequately protected.380  These cases reveal tension between an 
attorney’s professional obligations and regulations from external sources 
like federal laws. 
The problem with statutes like those at issue in the Milavetz and 
Humanitarian Law Project cases is that, as the Supreme Court explained in 
a similar context, “[r]estricting . . . attorneys in advising their clients and in 
presenting arguments and analyses to the courts distorts the legal system by 
altering the traditional role of  
the attorneys.”381  In recognizing the importance of “an informed, 
independent bar,”382 the Court further observed that “[w]e must be vigilant 
                                                           
 380. See supra notes 2 and 5. 
 381. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001).   
 382. Id. at 545; see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321–322 (1981) (holding 
that a public defender does not act “under color of state law” because the public defender 
“works under canons of professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of independent 
judgment on behalf of the client” and because there is an “assumption that counsel will be 
free of state control”).  
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when Congress imposes rules and conditions which in effect insulate its 
own laws from legitimate judicial challenge.”383  The advice and advocacy 
bans in Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project run the risk of doing 
precisely that—they insulate aspects of Congress’s bankruptcy and anti-
terrorism laws from legal challenge by preventing lawyers from advising 
clients completely about the application and meaning of those laws.  Even 
under the narrowed construction required by the Court’s holding in 
Milavetz, permitting the ban to stand means that certain advice may remain 
off-limits for lawyers and their clients.384  In some instances, these laws 
deter lawyers from offering any legal services that might be implicated by 
the bans.385  Moreover, although the Court upheld the ban in Humanitarian 
Law Project only as applied to the plaintiffs under narrow circumstances, 
going forward the holding is likely to have a significant chilling effect on 
legal advice to clients designated as foreign terrorist organizations.386  And, 
while Mohawk Industries did not challenge a federal statute, similar 
concerns were at stake, as Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged during oral 
argument when he reflected that preservation of attorney-client privilege—
a protection necessary to facilitate candid legal advice—is “central to 
maintaining the rule of law.”387 
Thus, Mohawk Industries also strikes at the essence of the same concerns 
about an attorney’s ability to advise a client as those featured in Milavetz 
and Humanitarian Law Project.  As the Supreme Court has long 
recognized, the rationale for the attorney-client privilege—“the oldest of 
the privileges for confidential communications known to the common 
law”—“is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys 
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice.”388  Without that full and 
frank communication, an attorney may not be able to offer essential advice.  
Similarly, if the possibility of an immediate appeal to protect that privilege 
does not exist, clients “may be less likely to engage in internal 
investigations to ensure their compliance with the law because the 
                                                           
 383. Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 548. 
 384. See, e.g., Wash Park Prophet:  Alas, Narrowed Bankruptcy Gag Rule Lives, 
http://washparkprophet.blogspot.com/2010/03/narrowed-bankruptcy-gag-rule-lives.html 
(Mar. 8, 2010, 12:29 EST) (listing concerns for attorneys offering bankruptcy advice in the 
wake of Milavetz, such as the continued inability to offer full advice and the potential breach 
of attorney-client privilege should it become necessary to determine whether an attorney has 
violated the statute). 
 385.  Some bankruptcy attorneys, for example, avoid any consumer work because of the 
restrictions under BAPCPA.  See Email with Peter J. Roberts, Partner, Shaw Gussis 
Fishman Glantz Wolfson & Towbin (July 22, 2010) (on file with author). 
 386. See discussion supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 387. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter,  
130 S. Ct. 599 (2009) (No. 08-678). 
 388. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
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assurance that the legal findings and conclusions resulting from such 
investigations could be maintained in confidence would be weakened 
considerably.”389  Though the Court ultimately was not persuaded by this 
argument, the case brings to light a problematic limitation on access to 
legal advice. 
For many in need of access to legal advice, however, the predicament is 
not whether an attorney can offer complete and candid guidance, but 
whether an attorney is available at all.  While in recent years Congress has 
demonstrated a willingness to limit the nature of attorneys’ advice, as seen 
in Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project,390 in comparison, Congress has 
expanded access by encouraging attorneys to take on meritorious cases 
through fee-shifting statutes.391  The Court, however, as explained in Part I 
of this Article, has been less than eager to do so.  The outcomes of Astrue, 
Hardt, and Perdue present a bit of a mixed bag but ultimately do more to 
undermine than support the effectiveness of fee-shifting statutes in 
facilitating and encouraging access to lawyers and legal advice.  Astrue 
leaves fee-shifting awards subject to offset; Perdue makes it less likely that 
fee-shifting awards will be enhanced.  These constraints on fee-shifting 
statues are especially alarming given the decline in affordable, accessible 
legal representation caused by the economic downturn of the past few 
years.  The chief state court justices for California and New York recently 
editorialized:   
As the economy has worsened, the ranks of the self-represented poor 
have expanded.  In a recent informal study conducted by the Self-
Represented Litigation Network, about half the judges who responded 
reported a greater number of pro se litigants as a result of the economic 
crisis.  Unrepresented litigants now also include many in the middle class 
and small-business owners who unexpectedly find themselves in distress 
and without sufficient resources to pay for the legal assistance they 
need.
392
 
In many cases, these are precisely the individuals that federal fee-shifting 
statutes are designed to assist.  For example, the Equal Access to Justice 
Act (the statute at issue in Astrue) “was enacted to improve access to the 
courts for small business and individuals by paying their attorney’s fees 
                                                           
 389. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 188, at 29. 
 390. For further discussion about Congress’s efforts in this regard, see infra notes 402–
411 and accompanying text.   
 391. See, e.g., supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 392. John T. Broderick, Jr. & Ronald M. George, A <ation of Do-It-Yourself Lawyers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at A21; see also Gillian Hadfield, Making Legal Aid More 
Accessible and Affordable, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2010, at A17 (“[A]mericans have a much 
higher rate of simply giving up in the face of legal difficulties, with effectively nowhere to 
turn if they cannot afford a lawyer who comes at a minimum price of $150 an hour.”). 
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when the Government has acted unreasonably.”393  But the Court has 
repeatedly undermined, rather than supported, congressional policy in this 
area.394 
In addition to raising concerns about how Congress and the Supreme 
Court limit access to lawyers, a number of the cases reviewed in this 
Article reveal harms that can be caused by inadequate lawyering.  The ten 
ineffective assistance of counsel cases taken up by the Court expose a gap 
in attorney regulation.  In some cases the lawyering is so bad that it would 
constitute misconduct for the opposing counsel (let alone the client’s own 
attorney),395 but it goes unaddressed because the bad lawyering does not 
rise to the  
level of a constitutional violation.396  In theory the attorney discipline 
systems administered independently by all states should kick in,397 but 
these cases suggest that this does not always occur.398  This pattern of 
limitations on access to legal advice and harms caused by bad lawyering is 
concerning.  Nevertheless it appears that the Court, for the most part, is 
willing to let the pattern continue, at least with respect to limits on access to 
legal advice (where the Court upheld five of the six limits at issue in the 
2009 cases),399 though certainly less so in the bad lawyering matters (where 
the Court ruled at least somewhat favorably for the criminal defendants in 
five of the ten ineffective assistance of counsel cases).400 
                                                           
 393. Brief of Amici Curiae National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ 
Representatives et al. at 11, Astrue v. Ratliff, No. 08-1322 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2010). 
 394. See, e.g., supra notes 94–108 and accompanying text. 
 395. See, e.g., supra notes 313–14 and accompanying text. 
 396. For a thorough and compelling discussion of the deficiencies in America’s criminal 
justice system, see AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE:  HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 
(Metropolitan Books) (2009). 
 397. As Justice Blackmun observed, concurring in the judgment in Jones v. Barnes, 463 
U.S. 745, 755 (1983), an attorney’s behavior may very well violate ethical standards but not 
constitute a constitutional violation. 
 398. See Renee Newman Knake, Study of Disciplinary Action in U.S. Supreme Court 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Prosecutorial Misconduct Cases (unpublished study, 
on file with author).  Several of these cases evidence acquiescence by the Court (and the 
legal profession) to the reality that having a lawyer may very well be one of the punishments 
inflicted upon those who find themselves charged with a crime.  See 463 U.S. at 764 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In many ways, having a lawyer becomes one of the many 
indignities visited upon someone who has the ill fortune to run afoul of the criminal justice 
system.”). 
 399. The only access decision that came down favorable to attorneys or clients in terms 
of encouraging access to legal advice and lawyers was Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life 
Insurance Co.  See discussion supra notes 132 to 142 and accompanying text.  
 400. For example, consider the Padilla and Porter cases where the Court found that the 
lawyer conduct at issue violated the Sixth Amendment.  Interestingly, the Court in both 
cases opened the opinions emphasizing the honorable military service by the defendants.  
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010) (“Padilla served this Nation with 
honor as a member of the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War.”); Porter v. 
McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2009) (“Petitioner George Porter is a veteran who was both 
wounded and decorated for his active participation in two major engagements during the 
Korean War; his combat service unfortunately left him a traumatized, changed man.”).  The 
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B. Lessons for Future Regulation of the Legal Profession 
A second observation to be drawn from these cases lies in the lessons 
offered for those involved in future regulation of the legal profession.  A 
number of the cases illustrate the consequences borne of increasing 
external regulation and treatment of lawyers as gatekeepers or service 
providers.401  Moreover, the Court’s reference to the role of the ABA in 
certain of the cases, whether ABA model guidelines or amicus arguments, 
should be heeded in order for the ABA and state bar organizations to 
remain relevant and effective in upcoming efforts to regulate the 
profession. 
1. Recognizing the consequences of increased federal regulation and the 
classification of lawyers as gatekeepers or service providers 
In recent years, scholars in the law of lawyering field have begun to 
consider how the role of lawyers has evolved in light of increasing external 
regulation (i.e., regulation beyond that administered by the state supreme 
courts based upon professional conduct rules promulgated by the ABA).  
As ABA President Carolyn Lamm has written: 
Unfortunately, the present system of regulation of lawyers [by the 
highest court of each state] is being eroded through multiple changes 
enacted at the federal level, without the needed study, thought and 
consensus and without central guiding principles.  A series of piecemeal 
federal laws and regulations threatens to undermine state judicial branch 
regulation of lawyers and to erode several of the cornerstones on which 
is built the client-lawyer relationship that protects both clients and the 
public.
402
 
The concept of internal regulation refers to professional conduct rules 
drafted by the ABA for adoption and enforcement by state courts.  External 
regulation, in contrast, includes federal action, like that cited by  Lamm, 
and also efforts such as provisions like the regulating of lawyers found in 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act403 and the Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
                                                           
Holland, Jefferson, and Sears cases are also exceptions to this observation, though the 
ultimate outcome for the defendants remains to be determined on remand.  See supra notes 
347–65 (Holland), 288–93 (Jefferson and Sears) and accompanying text. 
 401. The author is grateful for the suggestions from David Wilkins and Laurel Terry to 
consider the 2009 cases from this perspective. 
 402. Carolyn B. Lamm, Memo to Washington:  Hands Off Lawyers, NAT’L L. J.,  
Sept. 21, 2001, at 62. 
 403. For a discussion of the ways Congress controls lawyers under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, see Lewis D. Lowenfels et al., Attorneys as Gatekeepers:  SEC Actions Against 
Lawyers in the Age of Sarbanes-Oxley, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 877, 878, 929 (2006) (observing 
that “[t]he ushering in of what appears to be a new era of the SEC as an active and 
enthusiastic proponent of the attorney’s ‘gatekeeping’ role raises serious questions” and 
citing evidence that “the sheer number of SEC actions against lawyers” in the wake of the 
new regulation “has increased dramatically”).  For an example of an earlier federal statutory 
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Protection Act passed by the House of Representatives in December 2009 
(though subsequently modified to exclude lawyers, in large part due to 
efforts by the ABA).404  The problem with these kinds of federal laws, as 
Lamm explains, is that they “incorrectly identify lawyers and other 
professionals as ‘creditors’” or “‘debt relief agencies’” or “‘providers of 
financial products or services’” and consequently “interfere[] with the 
states’ rights to regulate lawyers and protect consumers of legal 
services.”405 
As a result of the expanding external regulation, lawyers are faced with 
increasing duties.  Two terms often ascribed to lawyers’ new duties are 
lawyers as “gatekeepers”406 or “service providers.”407  One concern about 
                                                           
constraint on legal advice, see J. Matthew Miller, Note, Balancing the Budget on the Backs 
of America’s Elderly—Section 4734 of the Balanced Budget Act:  Criminalization of the 
Attorney’s Role as Advisor and Counselor, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 165, 197 (1998), arguing 
that section 4734 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 unconstitutionally prohibited 
attorneys from counseling elderly clients about legal actions regarding Medicaid issues. 
 404. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) and ABA President Lamm Statement 
re:  “Exclusion for the Practice of Law” in “Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,” 
http://www.abanow.org/2010/06/aba-president-lamm-statement-re-exclusion-for-the-
practice-of-law-in-dodd-frank-act-of-2010/ (June 26, 2010) (explaining that the new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau established by the Dodd-Frank Act of Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 “may not exercise any supervisory or 
enforcement authority with respect to an activity engaged in by an attorney as part of the 
practice of law under the laws of a State in which the attorney is licensed to practice law”).  
For a detailed history of the “evolving relationship between the internal and external law” of 
lawyering, see Ted Schneyer,  
An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation of Law Practice, 30 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 559, 595–603, 608 (2005), detailing several developments and trends, such 
as:   
a shift in the regulatory center of gravity toward Washington with a corresponding 
shift from judicial to legislative and administrative regulation; [] greater emphasis 
on regulation that makes lawyers gatekeepers in order to protect public or third-
party, rather than client, interests; [] a growing tendency to place lawyers and 
members of other occupations that perform similar work in the same regulatory 
class; [and] 
 . . . a shift away from the primacy of the ‘internal’ law toward law that is 
produced, interpreted, and enforced by ‘external’ regulators.   
 405. Lamm, supra note 402, at 62 (citations omitted). 
 406. See Schneyer, supra note 404, at 582–83 (citations omitted) (“All lawyers are 
‘gatekeepers’ in the obvious sense that they may not knowingly assist clients in unlawful 
conduct and some have long had modest duties to monitor their clients as well.  But the term 
has taken on a more specialized meaning since the 1980s.  In this usage, it refers to auditors 
and other professionals who are in a position to prevent corporate misconduct or failures by 
monitoring their corporate clients or evaluating a company’s performance and withholding 
their approval or assistance when they detect problems.”).  See also David B. Wilkins, 
Making Context Count:  Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 
1164 (1993).  Professor Wilkins was among the first to identify what he calls the 
“‘gatekeeper’ strategy” for preventing a client’s misconduct in which “the lawyer can refuse 
to participate in the disputed transaction or otherwise withhold support in a manner that 
makes it more difficult for the client to accomplish its illicit purpose,” drawing from 
Professor Reinier Kraakman’s definition of the term “gatekeeper liability as ‘liability 
imposed on private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their 
cooperation from wrongdoers.’”  Id. at 1164 n.80 (citing Reinier H. Kraakman, 
Gatekeepers:  The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 
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characterizing lawyers in these roles is that the gatekeeper or service 
provider regulations can alter lawyers’ ethical functions in elemental 
ways.408  An example of this has been identified by Professor John 
Leubsdorf:  “where the bar’s main focus has usually been on the lawyer-
client relationship and the adversary system, new regulations often make 
lawyers gatekeepers charged to protect public and governmental 
interests.”409  Similarly, Professor Laurel Terry has explained that under  
the service providers paradigm, the legal profession is not viewed as a 
separate, unique profession entitled to its own individual regulations, but 
is included in a broader group of “service providers,” all of whom can be 
regulated together.  In [her] view, this new paradigm represents a 
fundamental, seismic shift in the approach towards lawyer regulation.
410
 
Her research documents how the service providers classification “already 
has affected some aspects of U.S. (and non-U.S.) lawyer regulation” and 
she predicts that it “is likely to have profound implications for the 
future.”411 
While the questions of who should regulate lawyers and how to regulate 
lawyers are not new,412 several of the cases on the Supreme Court’s 2009 
docket shed a fresh light on this predicament.  For example, the Milavetz 
and Humanitarian Law Project cases both stem from Congress’s treatment 
of lawyers as gatekeepers and service providers.413  Under the statutes at 
issue in each of these cases, lawyers find themselves with new obligations 
to police, or at least deter, the behavior of clients by denying them certain 
legal advice (and subject to hefty penalties for failure to do so).  Likewise, 
                                                           
53 (1986)). 
 407. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession:  The 
Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers”, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189, 
189 (2008) (“In the past fifty years, one has heard debates about whether law is a business, a 
profession, or both, what these terms mean and whether it matters.  Regardless of what one 
thinks about these debates, there is a new paradigm that must be added to the mix, which is 
the paradigm of lawyers as ‘service providers’.”). 
 408. A complete discussion of lawyers’ roles as gatekeepers or service providers is 
beyond the scope of this Article and already has been well-covered by lawyer ethics 
scholars elsewhere.  See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 404; Terry, supra note 407; Fred 
Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2004).   
 409. John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 971–72 (2009); 
see also James M. Fischer, External Control Over the American Bar, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 
59, 97 (2006) (discussing increased state and federal legislative control over lawyers). 
 410. Terry, supra note 407, at 189. 
 411. Id. 
 412. Indeed, as Professor David Wilkins wrote nearly twenty years ago in his seminal 
article on the regulation of lawyers:   
[d]uties to the legal framework require different kinds of maintenance than 
obligations owed to clients.  As a result, the question to be asked is not who 
should regulate lawyers, but rather how should policymakers coordinate the 
various resources at their disposal to increase the likelihood that all segments of 
society can benefit from a competent and independent legal profession.  
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 887 (1992). 
 413. See discussion supra notes 36–93 and accompanying text. 
KNAKE_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2010  10:44 AM 
1560 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1499 
under these statutes lawyers are regulated alongside non-lawyers who 
provide bankruptcy or peace-making services without acknowledging the 
distinct and important function of attorney advice and advocacy.414 
When lawyers are treated as gatekeepers or service providers, they cease 
to serve solely as the advocate and advisor to the client, which alters “not 
just the details of legal representation but its rationale and function.”415  As 
a result, “even when the new regulations appear to leave intact the 
substance of previous rules balancing the interests of clients and those of 
nonclients, they often impose more stringent penalties that will sway 
lawyers to pay more attention to the latter.”416  For these reasons, the ABA 
and state bar associations have argued “that extensive gatekeeping [or 
service provider] duties cannot be reconciled with the loyalty and 
confidentiality duties lawyers (unlike [other professionals]) owe to their 
clients, and that ‘deputizing’ lawyers as gatekeepers will discourage candid 
communication with clients or client agents and ultimately be self-
defeating.”417   
The ten ineffective assistance of counsel cases approach the question of 
who should regulate lawyers from another perspective.  A number of these 
cases expose how incredibly bad lawyering goes unaddressed when the 
conduct at issue is not sufficiently damaging to render it a constitutional 
violation.  While professional conduct rules exist to prevent the kinds of 
poor lawyering seen in the ineffective assistance cases, it seems that 
enforcement of these rules through the attorney discipline process is 
lacking in many ways.   
These concerns are reflected in several of the Court’s lawyering cases 
from the 2009 term.  The question that follows, then, is how should the 
ABA and state bar organizations respond? 
2. Appreciating the Role of the American Bar Association 
Several lawyer ethics scholars predicted this expansion of external 
regulation and proposed various ways the ABA and others might adapt.  
Indeed, nearly a decade ago Professor William Hodes forecast that 
“[u]nless the organized bar cleans its own house, sooner or later 
government agencies will remove the unique measure of self-regulation 
                                                           
 414. See e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that “service” is an overbroad term for regulating lawyers); 
see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1329 (2010) 
(deciding that lawyers are appropriately categorized as debt relief agencies whenever they 
provide qualifying services, and as such, are required to make certain disclosures under the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005). 
 415. Leubsdorf, supra note 409, at 960. 
 416. Id. 
 417. Schneyer, supra note 404, at 583. 
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granted to the legal profession.”418  Likewise, Professor Fred Zacharias 
declared that, “[t]he ABA’s purported goals of self-regulation—fostering a 
complete regime of appropriate lawyer behavior and forestalling external 
regulation—have proven unrealistic.”419  Instead, he recommended that the 
ABA and state bar organizations “attend to other functions that only they 
can accomplish,”420 such as programs for assisting attorneys with substance 
abuse. 
By comparison, Professor Schneyer has offered a slightly more 
optimistic future for the ABA’s regulatory endeavors, suggesting: 
[T]he bar can continue to have a substantial impact on the course of 
lawyer regulation, if it recognizes that the channels through which it does 
so will often be different than in the past.  In the emerging regime, bar 
influence will often have to be exerted by negotiating with, testifying 
before, and submitting reports and comments to “external” regulators, 
especially at the federal level.
421
 
Similarly, Professor Terry has proposed that “it would be useful for the 
ABA or others to develop a standard ‘template’ that could  
be used when considering a new legal professional rule.”422  She 
recommends that the ABA articulate its regulating objectives, that it 
conduct cross-cultural and cross-professional benchmarking, and that it be 
prepared to explain why special treatment is justified.423  She believes such 
an approach would not only “lead to better regulations” but that also 
“having thought through the justifications for its rules ahead of time, the 
legal profession should be in a better position to defend its rules if 
challenged” and the profession could more readily “identify those rules that 
are most likely to be challenged and for which it will need the strongest 
justifications.”424  To be sure, the ABA can do more. 
The Supreme Court’s handling of the ABA during cases from the 2009 
term illustrates this point in striking ways that provide helpful guidance to 
the ABA and state bar organizations for future regulatory endeavors.  For 
example, the Court paid an unusual amount of attention to the role and 
influence of the ABA as the source of model guidelines for the profession 
                                                           
 418. W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American Lawyers:  
Perception, Reality, and the Professional Reform Initiative, 53 S.C. L. REV. 527, 537 
(2002). 
 419. Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147,  
1189 (2009). 
 420. Id. 
 421. Schneyer, supra note 404, at 609. 
 422. Terry, supra note 407, at 210. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. 
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and as an advocate of practicing lawyers in filing amicus curiae briefs.425  
The Court’s heightened focus on the ABA offers at least two lessons. 
First, in advocating its position as a representative of the legal 
profession, the ABA needs to do its empirical homework.  The ABA 
should conduct fact-based, empirical studies to explain the unique role of 
attorneys and to support the position it advances, especially when necessary 
to justify treating lawyers differently from other professionals.  For 
example, during the oral argument for Mohawk Industries, Chief Justice 
Roberts commented on the ABA’s position in its amicus curiae brief “that 
the opening up of the privilege and the disclosure, however rare the case is, 
will, in fact, undermine the—the value of the privilege.”426  He explained 
that “[the Court]—I, at least, look at a brief from the American Bar 
Association and view that as a representation of how the people affected 
here, the lawyers, view the value of the privilege and what will happen to 
it.”427 
In the end, however, the Court disagreed with the ABA’s position in 
Mohawk, reasoning that “in deciding how freely to speak, clients and 
counsel are unlikely to focus on the remote prospect of an erroneous 
disclosure order, let alone the timing of a possible appeal.”428  Yet in a 
footnote the Court further observed that this conclusion “[p]erhaps . . . 
would be different if district courts were systematically underenforcing the 
privilege.”429  Had the ABA offered a study evidencing under-enforcement 
of the privilege or other empirical findings to support treating attorney-
client privilege differently than other protected material like trade secrets, 
the result might have been different.  At a minimum, the Court appears 
open to considering such information in future cases.  Empirical research 
might also assist in facilitating improvements for state attorney discipline 
systems.  
                                                           
 425. A number of Supreme Court commentators noted the unusual amount of attention 
the ABA received from the Court during the 2009 term.  See, e.g., Posting of Marcia Coyle 
to The BLT:  The Blog of Legal Times, http://legaltimes.typepad .com/blt/2009/11/a-
justices-curious-comment-about-aba-guidelines-for-death-penalty-lawyers-.html (Nov. 10, 
2009, 15:15 EST) (addressing the increased discussion of ABA guidelines in recent Court 
opinions); Tony Mauro, High Court Debates Value of Attorney-Client Privilege, NAT’L L. 
J., Oct. 6, 2009, http://www.law.com/ jsp/article.jsp?id=1202434312108 (discussing 
Justices’ skepticism regarding the protections due to the attorney-client privilege); Debra 
Cassens Weiss, ABA Gets ‘Shout Out’ in Oral Arguments About Attorney-Client Privilege, 
ABA JOURNAL, Oct. 6, 2009, 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_gets_shout_out_in_oral_arguments_about_atto
rney-client_privilege/ (noting the Court’s discussion and division of opinion in regards to 
the importance of ABA guidelines). 
 426. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 387, at 38. 
 427. Id. at 38–39.  But see Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1488 (2010) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“And we must recognize that such standards may represent only the aspirations 
of a bar group rather than an empirical assessment of actual practice.”). 
 428. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 607 (2009). 
 429. Id. at 607 n.2. 
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Second, another common thread running among nearly all of the cases 
discussed in this Article is reliance by at least one party on the ABA Model 
Rules as a measure for the reasonable actions of lawyers.430  In this way, 
the cases demonstrate the role that professional conduct rules play outside 
the lawyer discipline process, a function often underappreciated by those 
outside the law of lawyering field.  Not only did the parties cite ABA rules 
and guidelines, but the Court also explicitly relied upon them as a measure 
of what should be expected from a reasonable lawyer.  For example, in 
Milavetz, the Court cited Model Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits an attorney 
from endorsing or participating in a client’s crime or fraud, but at the same 
time allows an attorney to advise a client, when appropriate, about legal 
strategies for testing or challenging a law.431  In justifying a narrowed 
construction of the bankruptcy advice ban, the Court referred to 
requirements of Model Rule 1.2(d), implicitly suggesting that the federal 
statute not be construed to conflict with the Model Rule.432  And in the 
cases of Padilla v. Kentucky and Bobby v. Van Hook, the Court offered 
further insight about how it views the role of professional conduct rules in 
constitutional analysis.433 
While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to “constitutionalize”434 
standards of professional conduct, it has looked to the ABA Model Rules 
when evaluating attorney behavior in some circumstances, with a particular 
reliance on the Model Rules when evaluating the Sixth Amendment right of 
a criminal defendant to effective assistance of counsel.435  For example, in 
Padilla v. Kentucky, Justice Stevens wrote: 
                                                           
 430. See, e.g., Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 5, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651) (citing relevant ABA Model Rules and 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense Function); Brief for 
Petitioners at 44-–45, 71–72, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 
1324 (2010) (No. 08-1119) (citing ABA Model Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 7.1, and 8.4 to argue 
against categorizing an attorney as a debt relief agency); Respondent’s Brief, supra note 
123, at 59 (referencing ABA Model Rule 1.15 in support of an argument permitting 
attorneys to receive fees from client windfalls). 
 431. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009) (“A lawyer shall not 
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of 
conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to 
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”). 
 432. See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1337–38 (rejecting the suggestion that the bankruptcy 
advice ban generally disallows debt relief agencies from discussing other subjects, and 
noting that “[c]overed professionals remain free to talk fully and candidly about the 
incurrence of debt in contemplation of filing a bankruptcy case”) (citation and internal 
punctuation omitted). 
  433.   See supra notes  270–87, 315–46 and accompanying text. 
 434. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (looking to the Model Rules for 
guidance but cautioning that “[w]hen examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful 
not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so 
restrictively as to consitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct”). 
 435. Id. (discussing the relationship between professional standards and the Sixth 
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We long have recognized that prevailing norms of practice as reflected in 
American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to 
determining what is reasonable. . . . Although they are only guides, and 
not inexorable commands, these standards may be valuable measures of 
the prevailing professional norms of effective representation . . . .
436
 
And the Court relied upon these standards along with those promulgated by 
other legal organizations to hold that the Constitution requires a lawyer to 
advise the client whether a plea carries a deportation risk.437  Specifically, 
the Court looked to “[a]uthorities of every stripe—including the American 
Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender organizations, 
authoritative treatises, and state and city bar publications—universally 
require defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation 
consequences for non-citizen clients.”438 
The Court adopted a different position, however, in Bobby v. Van Hook, 
though perhaps more due to the fact that the ABA guidelines at issue were 
outdated rather than reflecting a movement away from the use of such 
benchmarks for evaluating the duties and obligations of a reasonable 
attorney.439  The Court took issue with the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on a 
version of the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Guidelines) “announced 18 years 
after Van Hook went to trial”440 and faulted “the [circuit court for] 
treat[ing] the ABA’s 2003 Guidelines not merely as evidence of what 
reasonably diligent attorneys would do, but as inexorable commands with 
which all capital defense counsel must fully comply.”441  The Court held 
that “[j]udging counsel’s conduct in the 1980’s on the basis of these 2003 
Guidelines—without even pausing to consider whether they reflected the 
prevailing professional practice at the time of the trial—was error.”442  The 
Court further cautioned that “‘American Bar Association standards and the 
like’ are ‘only guides’ to what reasonableness means, not its definition.”443  
                                                           
Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel). 
 436. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). 
 437. See id. at 1483. 
 438. Id. at 1482 (citations and internal punctuation omitted). 
 439. See 130 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2009) (per curiam) (“Restatements of professional standards, 
we have recognized, can be useful as ‘guides’ to what reasonableness entails, but only to the 
extent they describe the professional norms prevailing when the representation took place.”) 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
 440. Id.  The Guidelines in effect when Van Hook committed the murder “described 
defense counsel’s duty to investigate both the merits and mitigating circumstances in 
general terms” whereas the Guidelines applied by the Sixth Circuit “discuss[ed] the duty to 
investigate mitigating evidence in exhaustive detail, specifying what attorneys should look 
for, where to look, and when to begin.”  
 Id. at 17.   
 441. Id. at 17 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). 
 442. Id.  
 443. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 
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Accordingly, the Court declared that “[w]hile states [and private 
organizations] are free to impose whatever specific rules they see fit to 
ensure that criminal defendants are well represented, we have held that the 
Federal Constitution imposes one general requirement:  that counsel make 
objectively reasonable choices.”444 
Thus it seems, going forward, the Court is likely to continue using ABA 
standards as guides for reasonable attorney behavior so long as the standard 
applied was in place at the time of the behavior in question, but the ABA 
should not simply assume this.  Concurring in Padilla v. Kentucky, Justice 
Alito criticized the majority by writing: 
The Court tries to justify its dramatic departure from precedent by 
pointing to the views of various professional organizations. . . . However, 
ascertaining the level of professional competence required by the Sixth 
Amendment is ultimately a task for the courts.  Although we may 
appropriately consult standards promulgated by private bar groups, we 
cannot delegate to these groups our task of determining what the 
Constitution commands.  And we must recognize that such standards 
may represent only the aspirations of a bar group rather than an empirical 
assessment of actual practice.
445
 
Likewise, Justice Alito wrote a separate concurrence in Bobby v. Van 
Hook to “emphasize [his] understanding that the opinion in no way 
suggests that the [Guidelines] have special relevance in determining 
whether an attorney’s performance meets the standard required  
by the Sixth Amendment.”446  In his mind, while “[t]he ABA is a venerable 
organization with a history of service to the bar, . . . it is, after all, a private 
group with limited membership. . . . [Its] views . . . do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the American bar as a whole.”447  Justice Alito would 
place the responsibility “to determine the nature of the work that a defense 
attorney must do in a capital case in order to meet the obligations imposed 
by the Constitution” with the courts, not the ABA.448  Though his views 
were not shared by the majority, the fact that Justice Alito felt compelled to 
issue a separate concurrence to the otherwise unanimous per curiam 
opinion suggests that the debate about the ABA’s role in this regard is 
ongoing among the members of the Supreme Court.449  A lesson for the 
                                                           
 444. Id. (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000)) (internal punctuation 
omitted). 
 445. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1488 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 446. Bobby, 130 S. Ct. at 20 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 447. Id.  
 448. Id.  
 449. The debate also was evident in Chief Justice Robert’s self-correction from “we” to 
“I” when expressing his view on the role of the ABA as a representative of  
the legal profession during the Mohawk oral argument.  See supra note 427 and 
accompanying text. 
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ABA is to ensure that in holding itself out as a representative of the legal 
profession  
as a whole, it actually constitutes an accurate representation.  The ABA can 
no longer simply rest its case on the history of exclusive state court 
regulation. 
C. Expanding Focus on the Constitutional Aspects of the Law of 
Lawyering 
Finally, if any question remains as to the importance of constitutional 
considerations in the study and scholarship of lawyer ethics, the Court’s 
newest lawyering precedent should end that debate.  Professor Monroe 
Freedman, credited with establishing modern legal ethics as a serious 
academic specialty,450 has observed that scholars all too often give 
inadequate attention to the constitutional aspects of the field.451  Yet, the 
overwhelming  
majority of the lawyering cases that sparked the Court’s interest during the 
2009 term involved constitutional challenges.452  Milavetz and 
Humanitarian Law Project questioned whether the First Amendment 
applies to attorney advice and advocacy.  The ten ineffective assistance of 
counsel cases forced the Court to revisit the constitutional rights and 
safeguards guaranteed to a defendant in a criminal trial.  This developing 
area of Supreme Court jurisprudence offers a bounty of material for 
teaching lawyer ethics and for continuing to build upon the academic 
scholarship addressing the constitutional issues of lawyer ethics that 
Professor Freedman and others have begun.453 
                                                           
 450. See generally Ronald Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, Appearance of Impropriety, and the 
Proposed <ew ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1337 (2006) (attributing the 
development of legal ethics as an academic area of concentration to Professor Monroe 
Freedman). 
 451. Professor Monroe Freedman made this observation in his comments as a panelist at 
the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting Hot Topic Panel.  See Monroe 
Freedman, Professor, Hofstra Univ. Sch. of Law, Ass’n of American Law Sch. Annual 
Meeting Hot Topic Panel:  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Increased Attention to the Law of 
Lawyering:  Mere Coincidence or Something More? (Jan. 7, 2010), available at 
http://memberaccess.aals.org/eWeb/ DynamicPage.aspx?Site=AALS&WebKey=b8e081a5-
3c1b-41ca-8c1f-c9d84b62a02f& RegPath=EventRegFees&REg_evt_key=e95fe6b3-00bd-
4570-950c-d1bfa09e510c). 
 452. See discussion infra notes 434, 435. 
 453. For just a small sample of the existing scholarship on intersections between the law 
of lawyering and constitutional issues, see Fred Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II:  Is 
Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601 (1990); Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence 
is not Golden:  Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859 
(1998); W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305 
(2001); Monroe Freedman & Abbe Smith, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, §§ 4.07–
4.09, 12.06–12.12 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2004);  Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be 
Damned:  The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 
1567 (2009); Erica Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy:  The Criminal Defendant’s Right to 
Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147 (2010). 
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CONCLUSION 
In response to the question posed at the outset, this Article concludes that 
the Supreme Court’s increased interest in the law of lawyering is more than 
mere coincidence.  Each case addressed during the 2009 term encompassed 
issues fundamental to the role of an attorney and the rights of a client:  
access to legal advice, effectiveness of counsel, attorney-client privilege 
protections, and fee awards.  Moreover, when considered together, the 
cases evidence increased attention to concerns about access to the legal 
system and effective lawyers, especially concerns involving constitutional 
issues.  Those involved in future regulation of the profession should pay 
careful attention to the lessons offered by these cases, as should 
practitioners and scholars in the law of lawyering field. 
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APPENDIX 
Set forth below is a list of cases involving lawyering issues over the past 
decade, collected as described supra notes 14 to 22 and accompanying text.  
1999 TERM 
• Portunodo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 63 (2000) (prosecutorial misconduct, 
comments during closing argument) 
• Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 473 (2000) (ineffective assistance 
of counsel, failure to file notice of appeal) 
• Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 264-65 (2000) (ineffective assistance 
of counsel, failure to file merits brief on appeal) 
•Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398-99 (2000) (ineffective assistance 
of counsel, sufficiency of mitigation evidence) 
2000 TERM 
• Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of 
Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001) (attorneys’ fees 
under fee shifting statute) 
 
• Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536 (2001) (First 
Amendment challenge to funding and legal advocacy restrictions under 
the Legal Services Corporation Act) 
2001 TERM 
• Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 688, 692 (2002) (ineffective assistance of 
counsel, sufficiency of mitigation evidence and waiver of closing 
argument) 
• Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 792–93 (2002) (attorneys’ fees for 
representing Social Security benefits claimants) 
• Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164 (2002) (ineffective assistance of 
counsel, conflict of interest) 
• United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002) (prosecutorial 
misconduct, disclosures required before plea agreement) 
 
2002 TERM 
• Brown v. Legal Foundation, 538 U.S. 216, 220 (2003) (lawyers’ trust 
accounts) 
• Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 514 (2003) (ineffective assistance of 
counsel, sufficiency of mitigation evidence) 
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• Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5, 11 (2003) (per curiam) 
(ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudicial closing argument)   
2003 TERM 
• Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675 (2004) (prosecutorial misconduct, 
disclosure of potentially exculpatory or impeaching evidence) 
• Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 178 (2004) (ineffective assistance of 
counsel, concession of guilt without defendant’s express consent) 
• Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 529 (2004) (attorneys’ 
fees in bankruptcy proceedings)  
• Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 13 (2003) (per curiam) (ineffective 
assistance of counsel, failure to raise argument about state’s non-
compliance with sentencing procedures) 
• Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 405-06 (2004) (attorneys’ fees 
under the Equal Access to Justice Act) 
 
2004 Term 
 
• Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187-88 (2005) (prosecutorial 
misconduct, use of inconsistent theories to secure convictions of two 
defendants for same crime) 
• Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 134, 139-40 (2005) 
(attorneys’ fees when remanding a case to state court after removal to 
federal court) 
• Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (ineffective assistance of 
counsel, sufficiency of mitigation evidence) 
2006 TERM  
• Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007) (ineffective 
assistance of counsel, miscalculation of statute of limitations period) 
• Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 468 (2007) (ineffective assistance 
of counsel, sufficiency of mitigation evidence)  
• Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 77-78 (2007) (attorneys’ fees, prevailing 
party requirement under fee-shifting statute) 
• Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pacific Gas, 549 U.S. 443, 445 (2007) 
(attorneys’ fees under federal bankruptcy law) 
2007 TERM 
• Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 121 (2008) (per curiam) 
(ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney participation in plea hearing 
by speaker phone)    
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2008 TERM 
• Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1772-73 (2009) (prosecutorial 
misconduct, disclosure of mitigating evidence)  
• Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1414 (2009) (ineffective 
assistance of counsel, withdrawal of insanity defense)  
• Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 858 (2009) (prosecutorial 
misconduct, disclosure of impeaching evidence) 
  
 
